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Distance, Lending Relationships, and Competition 
 
Abstract 
A recent string of theoretical papers has highlighted the importance of geographical 
distance in explaining loan rates for small firms.  Lenders located in the vicinity of small 
firms face significantly lower transportation and monitoring costs, and hence wield 
considerable market power, if competing financiers are located relatively far from the 
borrowing firms. 
We study the effect on loan conditions of geographical distance between firms, the 
lending bank, and all other banks in the vicinity.  For our study we employ detailed contract 
information from more than 15,000 bank loans to small firms comprising the entire loan 
portfolio of a large Belgian bank.  We control for relevant relationship, loan contract, bank 
branch, firm, and regional characteristics. 
We report the first comprehensive evidence on the occurrence of spatial price 
discrimination in bank lending.  Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and 
the lending bank and similarly increase with the distance between the firm and competing 
banks.  The effect of distance on the loan rate is statistically significant and economically 
relevant.  Robust to changes in model specifications and variable definitions, the effect is 
seemingly not driven by the modest changes over time in lending technology that we infer.  
We deduce that transportation costs cause the spatial price discrimination we observe. 
 
Keywords: spatial price discrimination, bank credit, lending relationships. 
JEL: G21, L11, L14. 
1. Introduction 
Banks derive market power ex ante from their relative physical proximity to the 
borrowing firms or ex post from private information they obtain about firms during the 
course of the lending relationship.  Banks located closer to borrowing firms enjoy 
significantly lower transportation and monitoring costs, to such an extent that “if other 
banks are relatively far, close banks have considerable market power” (Petersen and Rajan 
(1995), p. 417). 
We study the effect of geographical distance on bank loan rates, taking into account 
the distance between both commercial borrowers and their bank branch and commercial 
borrowers and other competing banks, while controlling for relevant relationship, loan, 
bank branch, borrower, and regional characteristics.  For our study we employ a unique 
dataset containing detailed loan contract information, including firm and lender identity and 
location, from more than 15,000 bank loans to (predominantly) small firms.  We also 
collect information on competing bank branches in the vicinity of the firm. 
In line with predictions emanating from theory modeling spatial price 
discrimination, we find that loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and its 
lending bank, and increase with the distance between the firm and competing lenders.  We 
identify banking competition and pricing strategies in our analysis by including both the 
number of bank branches (or, alternatively, branch concentration) and the distance between 
the borrower and competing bank branches in the vicinity.  We observe that increasing 
distance between the borrower and alternative lenders significantly relaxes price 
competition and results in substantially higher borrowing costs for the firm.  From a variety 
of exercises we infer that transportation costs, not informational asymmetries, are probably 




Economists have long analyzed price discrimination and inferred its importance 
(Phlips (1983), Thisse and Vives (1988), Stole (2001)).  Recent empirical work focusing 
on, for example, race, gender, and social price discrimination in the car, private mortgage, 
and business loan markets has rekindled interest (Ayres and Siegelman (1995), Goldberg 
(1996), Morton, Zettlemeyer and Silva-Risso (2001), Gary-Bobo and Larribeau (2002), 
Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo and Wolken (2002)).  We contribute to this literature by 
empirically investigating spatial price discrimination and by demonstrating its relevance for 
the pricing of financial contracts. 
Our analysis has two distinct advantages over current empirical work on price 
discrimination.  First, in contrast to race, gender and many other social variables, measures 
of distance are continuous and possibly less correlated with important but unobservable 
characteristics.  Second, the estimated coefficients in our analysis capturing the presence of 
spatial price discrimination can be linked to a well-defined primitive (i.e., the transportation 
costs resulting from the location of borrowers and bank branches).  This linkage makes it 
possible to benchmark the economic relevance of our estimates.  For example, our 
estimated coefficients suggest that in order to obtain a loan a new borrower may have to 
visit the bank branch between two and three times.  A repeat customer, on the other hand, is 
not required to undertake additional visits.  Our estimates also indicate that spatial price 
discrimination targeting borrowers located near the lending bank branch yields average 
bank rents of around 4% (with a maximum of 9%) of the bank’s marginal cost of funding. 
Taken at face value, our findings substantiate an important source of rents accruing 
to financial intermediaries, based on location.  “Location rents” are distinct from rents 




often attributed to pervasive informational asymmetries (Fischer (1990), Sharpe (1990), 
Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2001)).  Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003), for example, provide 
the first estimates of switching costs faced by bank borrowers.  Their findings imply 
average annualized bank rents of roughly 4% of the banks’ marginal cost of funding.
1  In 
our dataset, the increase of the loan rate during the average bank-firm relationship points to 
annual “information rents” of less than 2% of the bank’s marginal cost of funding. 
Sweeping global consolidation of the banking industry (Berger, DeYoung, Genay 
and Udell (2000)) and widely observed innovations in information technology (Berger 
(2003)) may erode both location and inside information as sources of bank rents.  Petersen 
and Rajan (2002), for example, document dramatic increases in distance and substantially 
changing modes of communication between small firms and their lenders in the United 
States over the last 25 years.  Our study complements their work by entering the distance 
between the firm and the competing banks in the vicinity into the analysis of the loan rate, 
by documenting that the distance between the firm and the bank in Belgium did not increase 
substantially over the period 1975-1997, and by arriving at estimates of bank rents 
generated by spatial price discrimination. 
Characteristics of both the Belgian financial landscape and the analyzed bank make 
our dataset ideally suited to investigate spatial price discrimination.  Belgium has a 
continental bank-based financial system, but is otherwise similar to the U.S. in general 
economic, financial and technological (both transportation and communication) 
development.
2  The aforementioned finding of moderate changes in distance in Belgium 
greatly facilitates the interpretation of the estimated coefficients and suggests that, in 




affected much by recent improvements in communication and information technology. 
The bank we study operates across the nation and across industries.  Most firms in 
its portfolio are single-person businesses, and many firms obtain only one loan from the 
bank.  Hence, even though ‘distances’ are typically rather small in Belgium, transportation 
costs may be important on the margin for the small borrowers in the dataset.  In addition, 
formalized interviews with bank managers indicate that loan officers located in the bank’s 
branches enjoyed substantial autonomy when granting and pricing small business loans.  
The officers’ own assessment of the development of the relationship with the firm, the 
skills and reputation of the firm’s management, and the quality of the firm’s business vision 
(i.e., “soft” information in Petersen (2002) and Stein (2002)) played key roles in the lending 
decision.  Though loan officers were required to “harden” their assessment internally by 
supplying key statistics and other relevant written information, much local discretion 
remained. 
To conclude, we consider our empirical setting to be uniquely suited to study spatial 
pricing and to analyze whether transportation costs resulting from the distance between 
borrower and lender, and borrower and competing banks, provide sufficient and reasonable 
grounds for loan officers to price discriminate.  In this regard, our work also contributes to a 
rapidly widening strand of the literature revealing the considerable impact of geographical 
distance on activities of financial intermediaries, such as spatial loan rationing (Petersen 
and Rajan (2002), Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002)), cross-border bank 
lending (Buch (2002), Berger, Dai, Ongena and Smith (2003), Buch, Driscoll and 
Ostergaard (2003)), and domestic and international bank branching (Grosse and Goldberg 





We organize the rest of the paper as follows.  Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
predictions regarding distance, lending relationships and competition.  Section 3 introduces 
the data and discusses the methodology used in our paper.  Section 4 displays and discusses 
the empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical  Predictions 
2.1. Distance 
Recent theoretical papers highlight the importance of distance in explaining the 
availability and pricing of bank loans.  Lending conditions may depend on the distance 
between the borrower and the lender and the distance between the borrower and the closest 
competing bank (Table 1 summarizes the theoretical predictions). 
In location differentiation models (Hotelling (1929), Salop (1979)), borrowers incur 
distance-related transportation costs visiting their bank branch.
4  Banks price uniformly if 
they cannot observe borrower location or are prevented from charging different prices to 
different borrowers.  Borrowers pay the same interest rate, but the total transportation costs 
incurred differ, depending on the firm’s location vis-à-vis the lending bank. 
However, if banks observe the borrowers' location and offer interest rates based on 
that information, they may engage in spatial price discrimination.  Banks are often informed 
about the borrower’s address before even granting or pricing a loan.  If borrowers pay for 
their own transportation, as is mostly likely to be the case, a bank will charge a higher 
interest rate to those borrowers that are located closest to its bank branch (Lederer and 
Hurter (1986)).  Closer borrowers face higher total transportation costs when visiting 




market power for the lender.  Similarly, a monopolist bank optimally charges a higher loan 
rate to close borrowers, as these borrowers incur lower total transportation costs.  
Consequently, discriminatory pricing based on location (and associated transportation costs) 
implies, for a given number of banks, a negative relationship between the loan rate and the 
borrower-lender distance and a similar, positive relationship between the loan rate and the 
distance between the borrower and the closest competing bank.  Further underlining its 
importance, Thisse and Vives (1988) actually show that spatial price discrimination arises 
endogenously, even when firms can simultaneously choose between uniform and 
discriminatory pricing. 
The cost of monitoring a borrower could also be related to physical distance.  Total 
monitoring costs could increase with borrower-lender distance, because of extra 
communication costs or transportation costs incurred by banks visiting the borrowers' 
premises.  Loan rates passing through such costs will increase with distance.  However, 
distance-related monitoring costs might also allow for discriminatory pricing.  In Sussman 
and Zeira (1995), banks face monitoring costs known to be increasing in distance.
5  As a 
result, lenders extract rents from close borrowers, because more distant competing banks 
take into account their own higher monitoring costs in their loan rate offers.  Spatial price 
discrimination based on bank monitoring costs again implies a negative (positive) 
relationship between the loan rate and the borrower-lender (borrower-closest competing 
bank) distance (for a given number of banks).
6 
2.2. Distance and Lender Information 
Lenders may initially be unsure about the exact location of the borrower.  For 




multiple centers of activity, it is not clear at first for the bank where to monitor.  In that 
case, the bank can engage in discriminatory pricing only upon becoming informed about the 
location and transportation costs faced by their borrowers.  In Dell'Ariccia (2001), banks 
become informed about the location of the borrower through first-period lending.  In his 
model, only "relationship" banks, lending to the same firm for a second time, can engage in 
spatial price discrimination, while de novo "transactional" banks have to resort to “mill 
pricing”. 
The severity of the asymmetric information problem itself may also increase with 
distance.  Hauswald and Marquez (2003) develop a model in which the precision of the 
signal about a borrower’s quality received by a bank decreases with distance.  Because 
banks will receive more precise signals about close borrowers, competing banks will face 
increasing adverse selection problems when approaching borrowers closer to the most 
informed bank.  Hence, the informed relationship bank can charge higher interest rates to 
closer borrowers, while the uninformed transactional banks will charge higher interest rates 
to borrowers located farther afield (due to the increase in the adverse selection problem).  
Ceteris paribus, Hauswald and Marquez (2003) derive a negative (positive) relationship 
between the loan rate and the distance between the borrower and the relationship 
(transactional) bank. 
2.3. Number of Banks 
In spatial models, the number of banks in the market is typically inversely related to 
the distance between the lender and the (closest) competing banks.  An increase in the 
number of banks (harsher competition) increases the likelihood of receiving a lower loan 




Zeira (1995) and Harrison, Sussman and Zeira (1999)) increases the number of banks, 
decreases the distance between any two neighboring banks, and decreases the loan rate for 
each bank-borrower distance combination.
7 
On the other hand, an increase in the number of banks may aggravate an adverse 
selection problem by enabling lower quality borrowers to obtain financing, resulting in 
moral hazard and credit rationing (Petersen and Rajan (1995)) or a higher interest rate 
(Broecker (1990), Cao and Shi (2001)).  In Dell'Ariccia (2001), adverse selection generates 
an endogenous fixed cost, constituting a barrier to entry in the industry limiting the number 
of banks competing in the market. 
Similarly, a decrease in the fixed-cost component of the relationship-building 
technology in Hauswald and Marquez (2003) not only leads to an increase in the number of 
banks and more competition, but also results in a retrenchment towards relationship 
lending.
8  The lower entry barrier then leads to sharper adverse selection problems and 
higher loan rates for the borrowers closest to the relationship lender, but lower loan rates for 
customers farther away.  In effect, loan rates will decrease (increase) more per unit with 
distance between the borrower and the relationship (transactional) bank. 
2.4. Distance, Borrower Information, and Experience 
Casual observation suggests that borrowers do not always frequent the closest bank, 
as most spatial models presume they should.  Incomplete borrower information and other 
bank product characteristics may cause borrowers to visit more distant banks. 
First, borrowers may not be fully informed about the precise location of all 
competing banks and the availability and conditions of the loans offered there.  Grossman 




differentiation.  In Grossman and Shapiro (1984), consumers buy a product from a 
particular seller upon becoming informed of its location through advertising.  The 
advertising itself is not localized.  The sales price in their model exceeds the full 
information price, by the magnitude of the transportation cost, as informational 
differentiation lowers the elasticity of demand.  In addition, consumers in their model, as 
they are unaware of all sellers, do not necessarily patronize the closest one.  Bester and 
Petrakis (1995) model the advertising of lower price offers.  In the absence of advertising, 
customers are only informed about “local” prices.  Producers will advertise lower prices to 
attract customers from more distant locations.  Hence, more distant informed customers 
will be observed to receive lower prices. 
Second, location is just one characteristic of a bank’s product that is important for 
its customers.  For example, Elliehausen and Wolken (1990) document that small and 
medium-sized firms in the U.S. are also influenced by other characteristics of the branches 
(convenience and hours of operation), banks (reputation, quality and reliability), and 
relationships (personal or long-term) when choosing a particular bank.
9  Hence, borrowers 
may not visit the closest bank branch when another bank’s loan product exhibits other, 
more preferred, characteristics.
10  And, once borrowers have experienced a good match and 
have observed the high quality of the services provided by their current bank, they will 
switch to another bank only when offered a considerably lower price (Tirole (1988), p. 
294). 
To conclude, most theoretical models imply a negative (positive) correspondence 
between the borrower-lender (competing bank) distance and the loan rate, caused by either 




Information availability, experience, and other product characteristics may abate the 
strength of the distance – loan rate relationship.  However, we know of no paper that has yet 
empirically investigated this association and its causes directly and comprehensively. 
3. Data 
3.1. Loan Contracts 
The unique dataset we analyze consists of 17,776 loans made to independents or 
single-person businesses,
11 and small-, medium-, and large-sized firms by an important 
Belgian bank that operates throughout Belgium.  The sample commences with all existing 
loans at the bank as of August 10, 1997 that were initiated after January 1, 1995.
12 
Characteristics of both the bank and the Belgian financial landscape make this data 
ideally suited to investigate spatial price discrimination.  The bank is one of a handful of 
truly national and general-purpose banks operating in Belgium in 1997.  The bank lends to 
firms located in most postal zones,
13 and is active in 53 different industries.
14  However, 
around 83% of the firms in its portfolio are single-person businesses and most borrowers 
obtain just one (relatively small) loan from this bank.
15  Consequently, even though 
‘distances’ are typically rather small in Belgium, transportation costs may be important on 
the margin for the small borrowers in the dataset.  In addition, geographical clustering of 
economic and financial activity in Northern and Central Belgium results in a substantial 
variation across the country in the average distances traveled. 
For each borrower we calculate the distance to both the lending bank and the 
branches of all other competing banks located in the same postal zone as the borrower.  As 
of December 31
st, 1994, we identify 7,477 branches,




located in 837 different postal zones (Table 2).  Each postal zone carries a postal code 
between 1,000 and 9,999.  The first digit in the code indicates a geographical region, which 
we call “postal area” and which in most cases coincides with one of the ten Provinces in 
Belgium.  A postal zone covers on average 26 sq km,
17 and contains approximately six 
bank branches.  A postal area covers 3,359 sq km, on average.  Not surprisingly, borrowers 
are often located in more densely banked areas, with on average more than 17 bank 
branches per postal zone, resulting in around 250,000 possible borrower – bank branch 
pairs. 
We employ both web-based MapBlast.com and PC-based MS Mappoint to track the 
shortest traveling time (in minutes) by car between the borrower and each bank branch.  We 
choose the shortest traveling time, the default setting in both programs, over a number of 
other mapping alternatives,
18 as we suspect that for most entrepreneurs in our sample 
variable transportation costs consist mainly of traveling time spent.  We provide concrete 
statistics on this issue when we discuss the results, and employ the fastest driving distance 
(in kilometers) in robustness exercises. 
Address recording errors, incomplete map coverage, and changes in street names 
(we have addresses from the 1995-1997 period, but the software uses up-to-date maps) cut 
down our sample.  We drop 801 contracts that were relocated to another branch or a new 
branch after the closure of the original branch.  Next, we conservatively remove the 
outlying 1% of borrowers located farthest from their lending bank, as we discover that a 
combination of address-recording errors,
19 mapping problems,
20 and non-standard 
borrowing motives and business arrangements
21 are responsible for most of these longer 




banks.  We return to this set of contracts later in the paper. 
Table 3 provides summary statistics for the remaining 15,044 contracts.
22 
23  Table 3 
shows the definition, mean, median, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of our 
variables, broken down into nine sets of characteristics: (1) geographical distances, (2) 
relationship characteristics, (3) competition measures, (4) loan rate and size, (5) loan 
contract characteristics, (6) loan purpose, (7) firm characteristics, (8) firm location, and (9) 
interest rate variables. 
3.2. Distance to Lender 
The median borrower is located around 4 minutes and 20 seconds from the lender, 
which (depending on the local road conditions) translates into 2.25 kilometers (1.40 miles) 
of driving at 31 km/h (20 mph).
24  In contrast, Petersen and Rajan (2002) find that the 
median distance between lending banks and small US firms covered by the 1993 National 
Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) is more than double that distance, i.e. 4 
miles.
25  However, the median firm in the NSSBF employs two to four employees,
26 while 
the median firm in our sample is a single-person business.
27  In addition, costs of driving 
differ substantially between Belgium and the U.S.,
28 and Belgian businesses may be limited 
by the size of the country in their choice of domestically located banks.
29  These arguments 
may also explain the even larger differences with the other distance statistics reported by 
Petersen and Rajan (2002).  For example, the average (75 percentile) borrower – bank 
distance in our sample is around 3 (3.5) miles, while the same borrower in Petersen and 
Rajan (2002) communicates across 42.5 (14) miles with his or her bank,
30 or across a 
whopping 252 (255) miles with his or her other financial institutions. 




banks has increased dramatically over time.
31  For example, the median bank-borrower 
distance more than doubled between the mid-70s and the early-90s (from 2 to 5 miles), 
while the average distance more than quadrupled (from 16 to 68 miles).  In contrast, in our 
sample the median and average distances between the borrowers and the Belgian bank we 
study increased by only around 30%, from 4 (6.85) minutes in 1975 to 5.2 (8.86) minutes in 
1997.
32 
Figure 1 displays the traveling time statistics for each year, which are calculated by 
subtracting the duration of the relationship between lender and borrower from the initiation 
year of each loan contract.  In effect, we assume that the address of the borrower didn’t 
change during the relationship period.
33  The horizontal scale of the figure lists the year and 
the resulting number of contracts in each year.  The right scale reports the means (dots) plus 
or minus two standard deviations (thin vertical lines) of the traveling times in minutes. 
Most of the modest increase in traveling time in our sample seems to occur during 
the early `90s.  This increase may be partly driven by the changes in the number of bank 
branches because of regulatory driven de-specialization of financial intermediation and 
resulting consolidation.  Indeed, Figure 1 (left scale) illustrates the small decrease in the 
number of branches of all banks during the same period.
34  Branch closures seem to explain 
most of the observed variation in traveling time.
35 
Possible selection issues may further complicate the assessment of this moderate 
growth in distance between bank and borrowers.
36  Actually, if we look at the evolution of 
distance by loan origination date, we find that average distance decreases from 7.7 minutes 
in 1995 to 6.7 minutes in 1997!  We are therefore tempted to conclude that our findings 




results in Buch (2002) and Corvoisier and Gropp (2001).  Both studies suggest that physical 
proximity continues to play an important role in European bank loan markets.  We will 
nevertheless control for possible changes over time in lending technology in robustness 
exercises. 
3.3. Distance to Closest Competitors 
We now turn to our other main variable of interest, Distance to the Closest 
Competitors.  The median (average) borrower in our sample is located 2 (2) minutes from 
the closest competitor or 3 minutes and 15 (50) seconds from the quartile closest competitor 
located in the same postal zone.  The quartile closest competitor is the bank branch with the 
25-percentile traveling time located in the same postal zone as the borrower.  We select this 
second measure to gauge competitor proximity for obvious measurement reasons.  
Omissions and recording or mapping errors are less likely to influence the 25-percentile 
statistic than the shortest distance statistic.  In addition, bank branches may not be entirely 
homogeneous in their product offerings.  In that case, we also conjecture that our 25% 
measure is more highly correlated with the distance to the closest, “truly” competing bank 
branch than the minimum distance metric.  In any case, we will also check for robustness of 
our results with respect to this a priori choice of proximity metric. 
The lending bank is located closer than the quartile (closest) competitor in more 
than 44% (25%) of the borrower contract cases, making distance a relevant bank (product) 
characteristic for a sizeable minority of the borrowers in our dataset.  While distance is 
important, a majority of the borrowers do not patronize the closest bank branch.
37  Hence, 
our statistics suggest that if banks price uniformly then transportation costs must be 




uniformly, then information, reputation, and other bank product characteristics in addition 
to location must play a role in the choice of bank branch and the determination of loan 
conditions. 
3.4. Relationship Characteristics 
Relationship characteristics control for information and experience effects and are 
therefore central to our analysis.  The first characteristic in this category, Main Bank, 
indicates whether this bank considers itself to be the main bank of that firm or not.  The 
definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is “having a monthly 
‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 (U.S. Dollar 2,500),
38 and buying 
at least two products from that bank”.  More than half of all borrowers are classified as 
Main Bank customers.  Main Bank captures the scope of the relationship (that is, whether 
this firm also buys other products from this bank and executes most of its payments via this 
bank).  If these sources of information improve the accuracy of the bank’s information or 
reduce the monitoring costs, then the measure Main Bank should reduce the expected cost 
of such loans.
39  But Main Bank also proxies for the exclusivity of the relationship and the 
resulting lack of information a borrower has about alternatives.
40  In that case, a main bank 
customer will pay a higher loan rate. 
The second relationship variable is the Duration of the Relationship in years with 
that particular bank at the time the loan rate is decided upon.  A relationship starts when a 
firm buys for the first time a product from that bank.  The average duration of the 
relationship in the sample is about eight years.  Duration proxies for the increased time for a 
firm to experience the banks’ products and to appreciate the added flexibility the bank has 




firm to tailor its products, the firm may also become locked-in.  In that case, a long-term 
bank customer may end up paying a higher loan rate. 
3.5. Competition 
We also enlist in our main analysis the Number of Competitors, which is defined as 
the number of bank branches (minus the lender’s) in the borrower’s postal zone.  In most of 
the spatial models discussed, the number of competitors corresponds inversely to the sum of 
the distance to the lender and the closest competitor.  This is also the case in our sample, 
although the correlation coefficient seems small in absolute value.  The correlation 
coefficient for the Number of Competitors and the sum of the Distance to Lender and 
Distance to the quartile (actual) Closest Competitor for each contract is only –0.023*** (–
0.103***).
41 
An obvious candidate to explain the small correlation coefficient is the spatial 
simplification embedded in the theoretical models discussed earlier in the paper.  
Geographical clustering of business and banking activities across a land surface may 
weaken any correspondence between distance and the number of bank branches.  In 
addition, there are also the differences in the surface area covered by the different postal 
zones.  A cursory look on the map suggests that many postal zones are roughly equal in 
size.  Exceptions include the postal zones in Brussels (which are small) and the postal zones 
in the provinces Luxembourg or West-Flanders (which are large).  Such differences are 
most likely related to differences in population density, the number of businesses, and other 
possible criteria the postal system used to zone the country.  We include eight postal area 
dummies (which cover around 100 zones each), in addition to the base case to control for 




in robustness exercises. 
3.6. Other Variables 
The rest of the variables are less unique to our analysis, so we limit the write-up 
here.
42  Consider the loan contract characteristics.  The first is the dependent variable, the 
Interest Rate on the loan until the next revision.  For fixed interest rate loans, this is the 
yield to maturity of the loan.  For variable interest rate loans, this is the interest rate until 
the date at which the interest rate will be revised as stipulated in the contract.
43  The average 
interest rate on a loan in our sample is 8.12% or 812 basis points (we employ basis points 
throughout the paper to facilitate the tabulation and interpretation of the results).  The loan 
rate varies widely not only nationally (the standard deviation is 236 basis points), but also at 
the branch level (the average standard deviation at the branch level is still 217 basis points).  
Loan fees are not included in our dataset.  Loan fees are rarely charged to single-person 
businesses and are set by the bank’s national headquarters.  It is therefore unlikely that loan 
fees will be determined by any of the local variables of interest. 
The median loan size is BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500), but varies between BEF 5,000 
(USD 125) and BEF 80,000,000 (USD 2,000,000).  We will assume in our empirical 
analysis that loan rate and size are determined jointly.  The variable Collateral indicates 
whether the loan is collateralized or not.  We have no further information on the type of 
collateral provided.  Approximately 26% of the loans are collateralized.  We will assume, 
as in Berger and Udell (1995), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and Elsas and Krahnen (1998), 
among others, that collateral and interest rate conditions are determined sequentially, with 
the collateral decision preceding the interest rate determination.  Indeed, collateral is often 




and may end up covering multiple loans.  However, we will investigate alternative decision 
sequences with respect to loan size and collateral in various robustness checks. 
Another loan contract characteristic is the Repayment Duration of the Loan.  For all 
loans to the firms, we know at what ‘speed’ the loans are repaid.  This allows us to compute 
the exact repayment duration of a loan.  We include the natural logarithm of (one plus) this 
variable in the regression analysis in order to proxy for the risk associated with the time 
until the loan is repaid.  Four dummies capture the effect of the revisability of the loan, as 
some loan contracts allow resetting the loan rate at fixed dates subject to contractual terms. 
We also include dummies capturing the loan purpose.  We have seven types of 
loans in our sample.  For bank-strategic considerations, we cannot reveal the relative 
importance of the types of loans.  Hence, we cannot report statistics, but nevertheless 
include the seven loan purpose dummies in Table 3 for convenient reference.  The 
distinction is made between Mortgage, Term, Securitizable Term, Bridge, Prepay Taxes, 
Consumer Credit, and Other Loans (we take the Other Loans category as our base case in 
the regressions).  The size of most loans is rather small, since a large part of our loans are of 
the Prepay Taxes and Consumer Credit type.  We further include a separate Rollover 
dummy (also listed in the Loan Purpose category), which takes a value of one if the loan is 
given to prepay another loan, and is zero otherwise. 
The firm characteristics include both proxies for the size and legal form of the firm.  
Table 4 reports the number of observations for each firm size – legal form combination.  A 
distinction can be made between Single-Person Businesses (82.98% of the sample), Small 
(15.99%), Medium (0.89%), and Large (0.14%) Firms; and between Sole Proprietorships 




(1.18%), Corporations (3.78%), and Temporary Arrangements (0.85%).  In the regressions, 
we exclude the dummies for Single-Person Businesses and Sole Proprietorships.  We 
include 49 two-digit NACE code dummies to capture industry characteristics.
44 
The interest rate variables are incorporated to control for the underlying cost of 
capital in the economy.  We control for variations in the cost of capital by including four 
variables.  The first is the interest rate on a Belgian Government Security with the same 
repayment duration as the loan granted to the firm.  We calculate this interest rate using the 
exact date of granting the loan to the firm.  Secondly, we include a Term Spread, defined as 
the difference between the yield on a Belgian government bond with repayment duration of 
five years and the yield on a 3-month Treasury bill.  Finally, we incorporate two year 
dummies for 1996 and 1997 (with 1995 the base case) to control for business cycle effects. 
4. Empirical  results 
4.1. Control Variables 
This section provides the empirical results of the determinants of the loan rate.  We 
analyze the determinants of the loan rate by regressing the loan interest rate on our distance, 
relationship, competition, and control variables, which include loan contract characteristics, 
loan purpose, firm characteristics, and interest rates.  We use the ordinary least squares 
estimation technique.  To benchmark our empirical model, we first analyze and discuss a 
specification containing only the relationship and control variables.  Afterwards, we add our 
competition and distance variables of interest,
45 discuss and interpret the competition and 
distance results, and perform supplementary robustness tests. 




characteristics and control variables.
46  Most control coefficients remain virtually unaltered 
throughout the exercises in this paper.  We therefore tabulate the estimated coefficients only 
once, in Table 6.  The loan contract characteristics include whether the loan is 
collateralized, its repayment duration, and the loan revisability options.  The coefficient of 
Collateral indicates that when a loan is collateralized, the loan rate decreases by 
approximately 51 basis points.  This result is in line with the sorting-by-private-information 
paradigm, which predicts that safer borrowers pledge more collateral (e.g., Berger and 
Udell (1990) and Besanko and Thakor (1987)).  However, it contrasts with results by Elsas 
and Krahnen (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998), who report a positive (though 
economically small) effect of collateralization on loan rates. 
The coefficient of ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan) is significantly negative at a 
1% level: an increase in duration from say five to six years reduces the loan rate by 14 basis 
points.  However, Crabbe (1991) finds that an increase in duration from five to six years 
increases bond yield spreads by around 11 basis points.  But the 72 corporate bonds in his 
sample have maturities longer than seven years, while 88% of our 15,044 sample bank 
loans have maturities shorter than seven years.
47  To replicate his empirical model, we 
replace ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan) by a linear and quadratic term in Repayment 
Duration, and restrict the coefficient on the Government Security variable to be equal to 
one.  Sampling only loans with maturities longer than seven years, we also find that an 
increase in duration increases bond yield spreads, although the effect is smaller (i.e., only 3 
basis points going from five to six years).  The estimated coefficients on the Repayment 
Duration variables for the full sample including all maturities suggest that repayment 




Alternatively, we replace ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan) by 20 Repayment Duration 
year dummies.  The estimated coefficients from this exercise suggest local minima at three 
and five years.  Hence, given the predominance of short loan maturities in the sample, we 
display the results from the a priori chosen and most parsimonious empirical model.  We 
note however that the main results reported later remain virtually unaffected when any of 
these replacements and/or restrictions are imposed. 
We also include four loan revisability dummies (but don’t tabulate these coefficients 
to conserve space).  However, we report the rejection (at a 1% significance level) of the 
hypothesis of the joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the four loan revisability 
dummies. 
The coefficient on the Rollover dummy indicates that if a loan is given to prepay 
another loan, the loan rate increases by approximately 21 basis points.  Term, Bridge, and 
Consumer Credit loans carry a significantly lower loan rate (but we don’t tabulate these 
coefficients to conserve space).  However, again we report the rejection, at a 1% 
significance level, of the hypothesis of the joint equality to zero of the coefficients of the six 
Loan Purpose dummies. 
Table 6 also shows that Small Firms pay a higher interest rate, while Medium and 
Large Firms pay a significantly lower interest rate than do Single-Person Businesses (the 
base case).  This non-monotonicity is due to differences in legal exposure.  Almost all 
Single-Person Businesses are Sole Proprietors (Table 4), and owners thus face unlimited 
liability for their business debts.  On the other hand, all Small Firms are Partnerships, 
Corporations, or Temporary Arrangements; their owners for the most part face only limited 




overwhelm the impact of limited liability, however, and lower the loan rate for the average 
Medium and Large Firms.  Corporations and Limited Partnerships with Equal Sharing pay a 
significantly lower interest rate than do Sole Proprietorships, possibly reflecting both the 
effects of limited liability and increased firm size.
48  While few individual coefficients on 
either the eight postal area or the 49 industry dummies are significant, both sets of 
coefficients are highly significant as a group. 
Finally, a significant fraction of the variation in the loan rate is explained by 
economy-wide factors.  The change in the loan rate due to a basis point change in the 
interest rate on a Government Security with the same repayment duration equals 0.5.  This 
coefficient suggests sluggishness in loan rate adjustments, possibly due to the implicit 
interest rate insurance offered by banks, credit rationing, or the downward drift in Belgian 
interest rates during our sample period.  This decrease in interest rates is actually reflected 
in our sample loan rates, as the (non-tabulated) coefficients on the two year dummies 
indicate that the average 1995 (1996) loan rate is a significant 127 (18) basis points above 
the average 1997 loan rate, ceteris paribus.  A basis point parallel shift of the Term Spread 
implies a positive 0.4 basis point shift in the loan rate.  The size of the coefficient on the 
Government Security variable found by Petersen and Rajan (1994) is around 0.3***, 
whereas the coefficient for the term spread is negative and insignificant.
49 
4.2. Relationship Characteristics 
We now report the empirical results concerning the role of relationships.  The 
impact of the bank-firm relationship is captured in two complementary ways.  Our first 
indicator of relationship strength, Main Bank, measures the scope of the bank-firm 




that a firm pays 41 basis points less when the scope of a relationship is sufficiently broad 
(Main Bank = 1).
50 
The second indicator is the Duration of the Relationship between the lending bank 
and the borrower.  We take the log of (one plus) the Duration of the Relationship, as we 
expect the marginal impact on the loan rate to decrease with the duration of the financial 
relationship.  Table 6 shows that the loan rate increases with the duration of the 
relationship.  This result was also documented and discussed in Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000).  For example, an increase in duration from the median (7.5 years) to the median 
plus one standard deviation (13 years) increases the loan rate by 10 basis points. 
4.3. Competition 
Next, we incorporate our measures of banking competition.  Table 7 presents the 
results.  In line with spatial models discussed above, we start by employing the number of 
bank branches of the competitors (Number of Competitors) operating in the postal zone 
where the borrower is located.  We add the natural log of one plus this number to the 
regression, and report the results in Model I.  The coefficient on ln(1+Number of 
Competitors) is not significantly different from zero.
51  Hence, when competition is 
measured by the number of bank branches present in the same postal zone as the borrower, 
neither the effects of induced competition nor adverse selection effects seem to dominate.  
We add the number of bank branches of competitors in adjacent postal zones to this 
variable, as the delineation of postal zones may not correspond to the relevant geographical 
banking market.  The coefficient on the adjusted variable is not significant either, and we 
choose not to report the results. 




measure of competition, the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI).  We resort to using the 
number of bank branches of each bank in the postal zone to construct market shares.  In 
effect, we assume coordination occurs between branches of the same bank, while our 
previous measure of competition assumed branch independence.  The resulting coefficient 
on the HHI equals a significant, but small, 35.3**.  This estimate implies that an increase of 
0.1 in the HHI, say from a competitive (HHI < 0.1) to a “highly concentrated” (HHI > 0.18) 
market,
52 would increase the loan rate by only 3.5 basis points.  The coefficient on HHI in 
our regression model corresponds to the (mostly) positive coefficients reported in the 
literature (Appendix A tabulates a few studies).  However, it remains difficult to compare 
results across specifications, banking markets, periods, and HHI measures.  Concentration 
measures are alternatively based on loans, deposits, or branches, and vary widely (across 
studies) in geographical span (Morgan (2002)). 
We introduce postal zone effects in Model III to control better for the geographical 
variation in competition and firm characteristics.  We exclude HHI and the postal area 
dummies, as these variables are by definition spanned by the postal zone effects.  We 
further drop the industry dummies, as collinearity problems constrain our calculations.  A 
Lagrange multiplier test indicates that the effects are significant.  We further test for the 
orthogonality of the random effects and the regressors using a Hausman (1978) test, and 
cannot reject orthogonality.  In addition, our sample has been drawn from a large 
population.  Hence, we report the coefficients for the random effects model in column III 
(the results for the fixed effects model are very similar).  The coefficients on all variables of 
interest are virtually unaffected. 




variation in competition (for example, Barros (1999) and Calem and Nakamura (1998)) 
and/or spatial variation.  Again, random effects seem preferable and the estimated 
coefficients of the other variables remain similar.  We choose not to report the results.  
Finally, in Model IV we introduce the Average Real Estate Price in each Postal Zone in 
1995.  The cost of bricks and mortar may affect the pricing of loans, and real estate costs 
differ substantially across Belgium (the average price across postal zones ranges from 0.35 
to 7.84 million BEF).
53  However, Model IV shows – surprisingly - that the Average Real 
Estate Price does not seem to have an effect on the loan rate, neither statistically nor 
economically.  Adding the Change in Average Real Estate Price in the preceding and/or 
following five years does not alter this result. 
4.4. Distance 
We now turn to a detailed discussion of the coefficients on the distance variables to 
identify which theoretical predictions can be rejected by the data.  We take for each of our 
distance measures the log of (one plus) the distance, as we conjecture the marginal impact 
on the loan rate to decrease with distance.
54  We will use a robustness exercise to 
investigate the impact of this choice of functional form. 
The negative and significant coefficients on ln(1+Distance to Lender) in Models I to 
IV suggest that borrowers located farther away from the lender pay a lower loan rate at the 
lending bank.  These results are consistent with spatial price discrimination, as the lending 
bank charges a higher loan rate to borrowers with greater proximity.  In addition, the 
lender’s market power increases with the distance between the borrower and the closest 
competitors, as indicated by the positive and significant coefficient on the variable 




and the closest competitor may identify strategic behavior between banks that our other 
competition variables did not (or only partly) pick up.  Indeed, even after controlling for the 
number of competitors, branch concentration, postal zone, and bank branch effects, the 
lending bank seems to enjoy substantial market power, which increases with the distance to 
the closest competitors.  These results thus reject uniform pricing and monitoring cost 
theories without discriminatory pricing.
55 
The price discrimination models based on linear transportation costs and/or 
monitoring costs discussed in section 2 further provide precise theoretical predictions 
concerning the sum of the coefficients on both distance measures (this prediction is not 
present in the asymmetric information models we discussed).  In particular, given the 
location of bank branches, a marginal shift in the location of the borrower implies that the 
sum of the coefficients on both distance measures should equal zero.  Therefore, in line 
with this theoretical prediction emanating from simple location models, we restrict the sum 
of the coefficients on both distance measures to equal zero in Model II (these coefficients 
are mostly easily interpretable).  We test the restriction and report the results in Model V.  
The F-statistic equals 8.6; hence, we cannot reject the equality restriction. 
Both distance effects are not only statistically but also economically relevant 
(obviously, our distance measures are just one set of all the factors explaining the variation 
in loan rates).  An increase of one standard deviation in the distance between borrower and 
lender (i.e., the traveling time increasing from 0 to 7.3 minutes), decreases the loan rate by 
18 basis points in Model V.
56  An increase of one standard deviation in the distance 
between borrower and the closest competitors (from 0 to 2.3 minutes) increases the loan 





For the median loan of BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500), annual outlays for the borrower 
decrease by BEF 72 (USD 1.8) per extra minute of traveling to the lender.
58  Belgian 
entrepreneurs and (bank) managers made around BEF 20 / minute in 1995,
59 while the 
operating costs for a car (gas, maintenance, tires) may have amounted to around BEF 3 / 
minute of driving.
60  According to a linear transportation cost model, thus, the median 
borrower is expected to make one-and-a-half additional round-trips to his bank branch as a 
direct result of the new loan.
61  Alternatively, according to a linear monitoring cost model, 
loan officers are expected to make three round-trip visits to their median borrowers.  Hence, 
we find our spatial discrimination estimates economically interesting on the margin, but 
also reasonable (given that, for instance, loan repayment can be organized by mail). 
On the basis of the estimates we can also assess the magnitude of possible bank 
rents.  Borrowers located very close to the lender (say in the same housing block) will be 
charged 14 basis points more, on average, than a borrower located right between the lender 
and the quartile closest competitor.
62  Hence, “location rents” extracted from the closest 
borrowers are around 4% (and can be as high as 9%) of the bank’s marginal cost of funding, 
which we take to be the interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal 
repayment duration as the loan given to the firm.  Location rents extracted from the average 
observed borrower amount to around 0.5% of the marginal cost. 
To put these location rents in perspective, note that the loan rate increases by 62 
basis points over 26 years (the period the longest observed relationship lasts).  This 
maximum increase implies annualized “information rents” of less than 7% of the marginal 
cost of funding.
63  Information rents extracted from the average observed borrower amount 




4.5. Transportation Costs or Asymmetric Information? 
To recap, the bank in our study does not seem to practice uniform loan pricing.  On 
the contrary, borrowers located closer to the lender and farther away from competitors incur 
higher loan rates.  We also observe that an increase in the distance between borrower and 
lender decreases the loan rate by a similar amount than a decrease in the distance between 
borrower and the closest competitors.  The transportation costs we impute are reasonable. 
However, as argued in section 2, distance may also affect the quantity and quality of 
information that banks and borrowers have about each other.  To disentangle whether the 
effects of distance on the loan rate hinge on transportation costs or informational 
asymmetries, we start by interacting our two distance measures with the bank-firm 
relationship variables in Model VI in Table 7.  The results are very interesting.  The 
distance coefficients now capture the impact of distance for “transactional borrowers” 
(Main Bank = 0 and Duration of Relationship = 0).  The restricted coefficients from this 
regression (which equal -/+ 14.2***) suggest that (according to a linear transportation 
model) a transactional borrower in our sample expects to visit his branch two-and-a-half 
times per year as a result of a new BEF 300,000 (USD 7,500) loan – one time more than the 
median borrower in Model V.  Again, we would argue that the number of imputed visits is 
quite reasonable. 
Main Bank – “relationship” customers, on the other hand, seem shielded from 
discriminatory loan pricing.  Indeed, we cannot reject the joint equality to zero of the sum 
of the coefficients on the distance measures and the respective interaction terms with the 
Main Bank variable (F = 0.156).  Remember that a main bank borrower buys at least two 




at least BEF 100,000 (USD 2,500) per month.  Hence, the lender probably knows its main 
bank borrowers better than it knows its other borrowers.  At the same time, the main bank 
borrowers themselves may be less informed about alternative banks, their products, and 
prices. 
How then to interpret our results?  The uninformed (transactional) lender in 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003) charges a higher loan rate to remote borrowers in order to 
compensate for the adverse selection problem, which intensifies in the vicinity of an 
informed (relationship) lender.  The informed lender accordingly extracts a higher loan rate 
from closer borrowers.  However, our results so far show a loan rate charged to relationship 
borrowers that is essentially unaffected by the lender-borrower distance, and a loan rate to 
transactional borrowers that actually decreases with the lender-borrower distance (this result 
is independent of the equality restriction, which can not be rejected in the first place).   
It is possible that no bank in the vicinity of a firm is informed.  In other words, the 
loans we classify as transactional are of this type “all-around”.  The lending bank is 
uninformed about the borrower, but can infer that no alternative lender in the vicinity of the 
borrower is informed, either.  In that case, there is obviously no adverse selection issue.  
However, this interpretation seems at odds with our finding that the transactional borrowers 
are on average more than five years older than the main bank borrowers.
64  The age 
differential suggests that transactional borrowers may be switching banks, which makes it 
less likely that other lenders are uninformed.  In addition, the positive coefficient of the 
Duration of the Relationship variable suggests that lenders do become more informed about 
their borrowers.  Admittedly, the other banks may have lent on an arm’s length basis or may 




information they had collected over time may have become stale.  While in all these cases 
the banks in the vicinity of the transactional borrower are not that well informed either, we 
suspect that they are at least on average more informed than the current lender.  It is just 
that the magnitude of the adverse selection problem in our dataset doesn’t increase 
discernibly with physical distance. 
What about the differential information borrowers (but not lenders) have as a driver 
of our results?  As non-main bank borrowers in our sample possibly patronized other banks 
before turning to the currently observed lender, they may have been initially less informed 
about the lending conditions that the observed lender was willing to provide.  The more 
distant, the less informed they might have been.  It is possible that these transactional firms 
become more informed and interested in a particular term loan or line of credit by the 
advertisements of lower loan rates by the observed lender (Bester and Petrakis (1995)).  The 
offered rate could then reasonably be expected to decrease with distance, commensurate 
with the informational asymmetry.  However, a critical problem with this interpretation is 
that non-main bank customers actually pay a higher loan rate in our sample.  The latter 
result is not at all compatible with the non-main bank borrowers becoming more informed 
in a location cum information model.  Indeed, more informed borrowers are expected to be 
more price-sensitive, not less.  Alternatively, the negative sign on the Main Bank variable 
could be a reflection of cross-subsidization. 
To conclude, we think a more mundane but possibly more coherent explanation for 
our findings is that the borrowers are exposed to price discrimination based on 
transportation costs.  However, the effects are somewhat obfuscated for main bank 




products.  We will critically investigate the transportation cost story further in the next 
section. 
4.6. Firm Location, Loan Characteristics, and Distance 
Both MapBlast.com and Mappoint account for road categorization when calculating 
traveling times.  Traffic congestion, however, is not taken into account.  As congestion is 
more common in cities than in the countryside, we introduce a dummy variable Urban and 
interaction terms with our two distance measures.  Urban equals one when the borrower is 
located in an agglomeration with more than 250,000 inhabitants,
65 and zero otherwise.  The 
coefficients on the interaction terms in Model VII in Table 7 indicate that urban borrowers 
experience discrimination twice as harshly, possibly suggesting that traffic congestion 
substantially increases actual traveling times in urban areas (the other coefficients are 
broadly unaffected).
66  In addition, rural borrowers pay on average 35 basis points less than 
urban dwellers. 
The latter result raises the troubling possibility that farms (located in rural areas) and 
manufacturing companies (located on the outskirts of towns) pay a lower loan rate than 
service-type companies (located downtown and possibly close to bank branches) - not 
because of location, but because of, say, the tangibility of their assets.  The firm variables 
employed so far, including the 49 industry dummies, may not fully absorb such differences 
in firm characteristics across location, resulting in a “spuriously” estimated effect of 
distance on the loan rates.  We therefore also split the sample by sector.  We identify 247 
Agricultural, Fishing, and Mining firms, 900 Manufacturing firms, and 13,897 Service 
firms.  The average Agricultural, Fishing, and Mining firm in the sample is indeed located 




Manufacturing firm (we choose not to tabulate these comparisons).  On the other hand, 
Manufacturing and Service firms do not differ statistically in their location vis-à-vis the 
lending or the closest competitor’s bank branch.  Table 8 reports the coefficients for the 
three main regressions split along sector (we retain the model numbering introduced in 
Table 7 throughout the paper).  The distance coefficients for the three sectors are 
surprisingly similar in magnitude, although fewer observations in the Agriculture, Fishing, 
and Mining and Manufacturing sectors prevent most coefficients from being statistically 
significant.  Hence, differences in firm characteristics (such as asset tangibility) that may be 
correlated with location seemingly do not drive our results.  Nevertheless, we use 
augmented samples later in the paper to control even better for firm heterogeneity. 
Next, Table 9 splits the sample by “relative distance”.
67  We report the means of all 
relevant loan and firm characteristics by whether or not the borrower is closer to the Lender 
or closer to the quartile Closest Competitor.  We also report the results of a standard 
difference-of-means test.  For easy comparison, we replicate the means for the Full Sample 
taken from Table 3 in the first column of Table 9.  As Table 9 demonstrates, the 
characteristics of the firms borrowing from closer or more distant lenders do not differ 
substantially.  The differences in means of the proportion of most legal forms and age are 
insignificant, while the other differences in means of firm characteristics are significant but 
economically small.  These findings cast further doubt on a lender information 
interpretation of the distance coefficients, as we will argue in the next section. 
Even more striking in Table 9 is the observation that distant borrowers obtain larger 
or longer term loans at a lower rate on a collateralized or transactional basis.  These 




cost nature of transportation costs, on the basis of which the lender price discriminates.  
Start with loan size.  Loan size is actually exogenous in most location models.  By 
introducing Loan Size in the specifications, we assume in effect a sequential decision 
process (setting first the loan size followed by the loan rate).  We report the results in the 
first column of Table 10.  We focus on the equivalent of a stripped-down version of earlier 
models (in particular Model V in Table 7), as its parsimony will be needed in subsequent 
sub sample exercises (the full specification yields similar results).  The coefficient on Loan 
Size equals –22.6**.  The coefficient indicates that an increase in loan size from the median 
(BEF 0.30 mln.; USD 7,500) to the mean (BEF 0.88 mln.; USD 22,000) amount decreases 
the interest rate by 13 basis points.  The other coefficients, particularly the distance 
coefficients, remain virtually unaltered and, again, we cannot reject the equality restriction 
involving the distance coefficients. 
Next, we aim to recognize the possible interdependence between loan size, rate, and 
distance.  Loan size and rate may be determined jointly.  In addition, the impact of distance 
on the loan rate may decrease with loan size, due to the fixed-cost character of the incurred 
transportation costs.  Rather than estimating an ad-hoc system, we opt for stratifying the 
sample by loan size, with cut-offs set at BEF 0.2 and 2 million (USD 5,000 and 50,000).  
We report all relevant coefficients by size category in three columns in Table 10.  The 
noticeable increase in adjusted R
2 across size categories may reflect the greater role played 
by observable, “hard” information in the pricing of larger loans.  
The distance coefficients decrease by loan size, but remain significant for the two 
categories containing the smallest and medium sized loans.  We can also not reject the 




although the coefficients decrease, the outlays per minute of extra travel time are strikingly 
similar.  For the median loan sizes in each group (i.e., BEF 109,000; BEF 500,001; and 
BEF 3,105,000), a minute of extra travel time costs BEF 47, 58, and 63, respectively.  We 
find this equality in imputed traveling costs very suggestive of price discrimination on the 
basis of transportation costs.  Though currently not theoretically modeled (as far as we are 
aware), the deterioration of information quality across distance would, we conjecture, give 
rise to loan rate schedules in distance that are independent of loan size.  Obviously, that is 
not what we find. 
We also split the sample at the median Repayment Duration of the Loan (0.55 years) 
and tabulate the results in two columns in Table 10.  The distance coefficients for the group 
of loans with a duration shorter than 0.55 equal –/+21.0***; the coefficients for the longer 
term loans equal -/+6.3**.  As the median duration in the short-term group is 0.4 and in the 
long-term group 2.4 years, the size of the coefficients again implies a strikingly similar 
fixed transportation cost per loan of equal duration. 
Next, we drop the Collateral dummy from the specifications, and then study 
separately the sets of contracts with and without collateral.  Dropping Collateral hardly 
affects our main results, and we choose not to tabulate the results to conserve space.  To run 
all specifications on the subsets of contracts, we again drop loan contract and firm 
characteristics, and report the results in the last two columns of Table 10.  Distance 
continues to play a large role in the pricing of the 11,073 contracts without collateral.  The 
distance coefficients equal minus and plus 12.9***, respectively.  On the other hand, the 
distance coefficients for the 3,971 collateralized contracts drop to -/+ 2.3, with a standard 




reject the equality restriction of the two distance coefficients.  Though borrowers with or 
without collateral are equally likely to be main bank customers, posting collateral softens 
spatial price discrimination.  However, posting collateral also substantially weakens the 
impact of the Duration of the Relationship, Loan Size, and Main Bank on the loan rate.  
This finding suggests that collateralization blurs the informativeness of the loan rate in 
general. 
In the first two columns in Table 11 we further distinguish between “Lines of 
Credit” and other loans we label “Term Loans”.  Berger and Udell (1995) and Harhoff and 
Körting (1998), for example, argued persuasively that lines of credit tend to be relationship-
driven and based on the overall creditworthiness of the firm.  However, more than 90% of 
the 3,678 loans in our sample that embed a revolving option are actually collateralized, and 
none involve the usual up-front or back-end fees and compensating balances often observed 
in the U.S. (Saunders and Cornett (2002), p. 329).  In addition, revolving loans are on 
average more than seven times larger than non-revolving loans.  Nevertheless, the results 
again confirm that spatial price discrimination mainly affects the “transactional” loans.  
Unreported sample split exercises suggest that also un-collateralized or small and medium 
sized (< 2 mln. BEF) lines of credit are not affected by spatial price discrimination. 
Finally, we break up the sample by loan purpose and obtain 3,490 Capital 
Expenditure and 11,554 Non Capital Expenditure Loans (Mortgage, Term, and 
Securitizable Term Loans are classified as Capital Expenditure Loans).  All Capital 
Expenditure Loans are revolving loans, and most are collateralized.  Capital Expenditure 
Loans are on average more than seven times larger than the other loans.  Not surprisingly, 




Credit coefficients just reported.  Spatial price discrimination seemingly affects only the 
“Non Capital Expenditure Loans” category.  However, unreported exercises show that the 
“transactional” loans (Main Bank = 0 and Duration of Relationship = 0) among the 1,773 
small and medium sized (< 2 mln. BEF) Capital Expenditure Loans are subject to 
statistically significant and economically relevant spatial price discrimination: the 
coefficients on the distance variables equal -/+ 9.3*.  This is not the case for the 
“transactional” un-collateralized Capital Expenditure Loans.  If anything, the coefficients 
on the distance variables for the 187 un-collateralized Capital Expenditure Loans are 
actually the opposite of the full sample results. 
4.7. Firm Characteristics and Distance 
We exploited the variation in loan characteristics and further underpinned the 
transportation cost interpretation of the distance coefficients.  However, we remain 
concerned that firm characteristics may drive both loan rate and distance, and thus 
spuriously affect our results.  The bank may ration credit to more distant borrowers unless 
they are assessed to be of impeccable quality.  Problematic for the econometrician is that 
the bank may determine the quality of the firm by combining both observable and (for us) 
unobservable firm characteristics.  The lower loan rate for the more distant borrowers in the 
specifications we report so far would then simply be the result of an omitted variable 
problem. 
We address this critical issue, first by altering the degree of firm heterogeneity in the 
sample, and second by investigating an augmented sample for which we obtain more firm 
characteristics (reported in Section 4.8).  We start by restricting the sample to Single-Person 




report the results in Table 11.  The coefficients on all measures of interest (except Main 
Bank) remain largely unaltered.
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Next, we drop 1,744 contracts located in 149 postal zones bordering other countries 
(the Netherlands, Germany, Luxembourg, and France).  Firms located in one of these postal 
zones may differ from interior firms in terms of specialization, customer base, and labor 
force.  These firms also face additional constraints in finding another Belgian bank, or 
alternatively have the opportunity to employ a foreign bank located in an area adjacent to 
their postal zone (given the size of the firms in our sample and the exchange rate exposure 
involved, however, we consider the latter scenario to be rather unlikely).  Dropping these 
contracts does not affect our results, and we choose not to report the almost identical 
coefficients. 
Finally, the last two columns in Table 11 split the sample by relative distance (i.e. 
whether the Lender or the quartile Competitor are closest to the borrower).  We thus check 
for possible structural differences in the determination of the loan rate across the two 
groups of borrowers.  All coefficients, except the coefficient on loan size, are remarkably 
similar across the two groups.  Hence, at first sight the firms in both groups do not differ 
dramatically in (for us) unobservable characteristics. 
4.8. Augmented Sample 
To further investigate the issue of missing firm characteristics, we match loan 
contracts to BelFirst, a dataset containing yearly balance and profit/loss statements of more 
than 250,000 Belgian corporations.  Conservatively matching by tax identification numbers, 
we track 1,008 firms.
69  Quite a few Sole Proprietorships are not listed in BelFirst.  




(see Table 9) are surprisingly similar to the means for the entire dataset.  Most importantly, 
the means of both distance measures and the loan rate are not significantly different 
between the Full and the newly constructed Augmented Samples.  The differences in the 
other variables constitute an additional powerful robustness check on the empirical work we 
have reported so far. 
We study accounting data from the year preceding the origination date of the loan 
contract.  To evaluate firm risk and funding needs, we compare means of firm Assets and 
the ratios of Earnings, Short-Term Debt, Net Trade Credit, and Intangible Assets over 
Assets between the two relative distance groups.
70  The means are displayed in the last two 
columns in Table 9.  More distant firms are somewhat larger, more intangible, and obtain 
larger or longer term loans than closer firms.  Otherwise, more distant and closer firms are 
seemingly similar in profitability and debt structure.  Loan Size / Assets does not 
significantly differ across groups.  If anything, more distant firms seem less credit 
constrained once they obtain a loan.  We also track 936 firms through time, and use the 
Earnings in 2 Years / Assets in 2 Years (after the loan origination year) and Assets in 2 
Years / Assets as admittedly ad-hoc measures of expected future profitability and growth.  
Distant firms outperform close firms on average - both in earnings and asset growth, but the 
differences are not significant and the measures are fraught with survivorship biases (we 
cannot establish for sure why BelFirst ceased reporting the records of some firms). 
Next, we introduce the new firm characteristics in a few basic specifications in 
Table 12.  Model I features the Age of the firm, which we collected separately, while 
Models II and III include the newly constructed accounting measures.  Despite the 




Years / Assets in Models IV and V.  All specifications further incorporate three Firm Size 
dummies, eight Postal Area dummies, two Industry Sector dummies capturing respectively 
Agriculture / Fishing / Mining and Manufacturing (collinearity precludes employing the 
Industry dummies), the Interest Rates Variables, and an Intercept. 
We find that smaller and more indebted firms and firms taking out smaller loans 
(either absolute or relative to its assets size) end up paying higher loan rates.  The distance 
coefficients increase in absolute value to more than 20.  But these coefficients are estimated 
less precisely and remain significant only at a 5% level in all but one model (the standard 
deviations on the coefficients increase to more than 10).  Again, we cannot reject the 
equality restriction on our distance measures at a 1%-level of significance.  Excluding these 
newly introduced variables in the just reported specifications does not alter the estimated 
parameters of the other variables.  Adding firm Age to Models II to V further reduces the 
number of observations (to 936 and 792, respectively) and precision of the estimates, but 
does not qualitatively affect the results. 
To conclude, more distant firms are somewhat larger and take out loans that are 
significantly larger in absolute, though not in relative size.  Otherwise, distant and close 
firms do not differ significantly.  Controlling for the additional firm characteristics does not 
affect the distance – loan rate correspondence.  We contend that these empirical results are 
fully in line with price discrimination on the basis of transportation costs.  Remember that 
our estimates of the distance coefficients by loan size imply almost the same imputed 
traveling cost per minute.  These estimates and the results in this section indicate that 
borrowers, because of the fixed cost nature of traveling, will consider driving to more 




obtain these larger amounts of funding.
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4.9. Further Robustness Checks 
Before concluding, we subject the main results reported in Models I to V in Table 7 
to a battery of additional robustness checks.  First, we revisit our a priori choices regarding 
our distance measures.  We rerun all models employing traveling times in levels (rather 
than logs).  Results are mostly unaffected, although (not surprisingly) the coefficients entail 
somewhat smaller effects.  In Model III, the coefficient on Distance to Lender equals 
-1.1***, implying a decrease in the annual outlays for the median borrower of BEF 33 per 
extra minute of travel time to the lender.  Again, we cannot reject the equality restriction in 
Model V. 
We also replace the ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) (i.e., the 25-percentile 
measure) by the (possibly more noisy) ln(1+Distance to the actual Closest Competitor) in 
all specifications discussed so far.  We report the coefficients for the representative Models 
II, III, and V in Appendix B with the label “actual”, but do not tabulate standard errors to 
conserve space.  As can be seen from the table, coefficients are unaffected both in sign and 
magnitude, though (not unexpectedly) significance levels are somewhat higher.  We also 
replace traveling time by physical distance in all specifications and again report the three 
models in Appendix B, labeled “physical”.  Remember that (based on our calculations) 
physical distance may well be less indicative as a measure of transportation costs for 
entrepreneurs.  Nevertheless, while the coefficients decrease somewhat in size (for longer 
trips physical distance in kilometers exceeds traveling time in minutes), signs and 
significance levels are broadly unaffected. 




competitors determine the choice of lender, partly driving our results rather than spatial 
price discrimination.  Hence, we add the Starting Year of the Relationship (assuming 
technology progresses linearly through time) and the (national) Number of Branches to all 
models.  Even though ln(1+Duration of Relationship) and Starting Year are by construction 
almost interchangeable and highly correlated (-0.91), both coefficients are significant.  In 
Model V, the coefficients are 55.4*** and 4.5***, respectively.  The coefficient on the 
Number of Branches is insignificant.  More importantly, however, the results for the 
distance coefficients of interest in all discussed models remain virtually unaltered. 
Next, we also split the sample by contracting year.  We find justification for a 
sample split on January 1
st, 1996 in the observation that the Belgian monopoly telecom 
Belgacom (partly privatized only 17 days earlier) drastically reorganized itself to better 
focus on its customers.
72  While the costs of telephone calls did not drop substantially at 
once, this remarkable corporate refocusing may have raised expectations of lower 
communications costs in the near future.  Such expectations might have softened loan rate 
discrimination.  We run parsimonious models including distance measures, relationship 
variables, and the concentration index using alternatively the 393 contracts signed in 1995 
and the remaining 14,651 later contracts.  Though estimated imprecisely in the first 
subsample, the coefficients on our distance measures actually increase in absolute value 
from -/+ 18.3* in 1995 to -/+ 26.1*** in 1996-1997.  Combining these results with our 
earlier discussion leads us to conclude that technological developments may not be a major 
issue when interpreting our results. 
Finally, we return to the 612 contracts located in postal zones without any identified 




to 15,656.  We calculate the Distance to the Lender for each of these additional contracts, 
but we set their Distance to the Closest Competitors equal to zero.  We add a dummy 
(which equals one for each of the 612 contracts, and zero otherwise) to account for the 
undetermined effect of distance, and rerun all models.  The coefficient on the dummy in the 
postal zone effects model, for example, equals 39.5*** (with a standard deviation of 13.9).  
Hence, borrowers located in a postal zone without any competing bank pay on average 40 
basis points more than borrowers located in contested postal zones.  This coefficient is quite 
reasonable when interpreted within the confines of a linear transportation model.  The 
average postal zone covers a square of 5 by 5 km.  For example, driving 5 km to get to the 
closest competitor (now located outside the postal zone) at 31 km/h (the average speed) 
would result in ten minutes traveling time.  According to the estimates gleaned from the 
original effects model, a ten-minute distance increases the loan rate by 44 basis points. 
5. Conclusion 
We study the effect on loan conditions of the geographical distance between firms 
and both the lending bank and all other banks in the vicinity of the firm.  As far as we are 
aware, we report the first comprehensive evidence of the occurrence of spatial price 
discrimination in bank lending.  Loan rates decrease with the distance between the firm and 
the lender and increase similarly with the distance between the firm and competing banks.  
Both effects are statistically significant and economically relevant.  The results are robust to 
various changes in model specifications and variable definitions, and do not seem to be 
induced by the modest changes in lending technology we infer.  The observed stability of 
the Belgian bank branch system during our sample period allows us to interpret the 




models explaining spatial price discrimination. 
According to theoretical predictions, loan rates may reflect both transportation costs 
and informational effects.  We find that loan rates decrease more with lender-firm distance 
for transactional (single-product), short-term, un-collateralized, term (not line of credit), 
and non-capital expenditure loans.  Spatial price discrimination relaxes as borrowers engage 
the lending bank more broadly, for a longer time period, post collateral, obtain a line of 
credit, or use the loan for capital expenditure purposes. 
Transportation costs provide a simple yet coherent explanation for the loan rate 
schedules we observe.  Informational issues faced by the lender, on the other hand, do not 
play a prominent role in the pricing of loans according to the borrower’s location.  While 
we find no direct evidence of adverse selection increasing with geographical distance, it is 
possible either that most borrowers we classify transactional are unknown to all banks in 
the vicinity or that distances involved are just too small for informational asymmetries to 
become meaningful. 
Loan officers seemingly price loans by location, although distance variables are not 
featured explicitly in the “credit scoring system” described to us in interviews.  However, 
the revealed autonomy granted to local loan officers in assessing and pricing local loan 
applications may be optimal (Stein (2002)).  The acknowledged importance of qualitative, 
“soft factors” in the decision process provides the loan officers with the necessary 
discretion.  Such discretion is not unusual.  Brunner, Krahnen and Weber (2000), for 
example, provide preliminary empirical evidence (for Germany) of the importance of 
qualitative factors in setting loan rates through internal bank ratings.  The loan officers 




discriminatory pricing policy based on location and the presence of alternative providers of 
financing in the vicinity of the firm. 
While adverse selection does not increase with geographical distance, we confirm 
previous evidence based on the current dataset that loan rates increase with the duration of 
the bank-firm relationship.  Hence, both branch location and information acquisition during 
a relationship may yield bank rents.  Spatial price discrimination applied to borrowers 
located near the lending bank branch results in average “location rents” of around 4% of the 
bank’s marginal cost of funding.  Loan rate increases during the average bank-firm 
relationship point to annual “information rents” of somewhat less than 2% of the marginal 
cost. 
Initial work employing the current dataset suggests that adverse selection may 
further play a more prominent role with regard to bank industry specialization.  For 
example, we find that the borrower pays a substantially lower interest rate if it operates in 
an industry in which the bank is specialized nationwide.  While these preliminary results are 
outside the scope of this study, and consequently not reported here, the distance coefficients 
we report in this paper are robust to the inclusion of these additional controls.  In future 
work we plan to corroborate these findings, analyze industry specialization at the bank 
branch level, and test the intriguing hypotheses on bank industry specialization found in 
Boot and Thakor (2000), Hauswald and Marquez (2003), and Stomper (2001). 
To conclude, brick-and-mortar branching may remain vital in ensuring access to 
credit at reasonable rates, particularly for small firms and entrepreneurs.  Belgium was 
clearly over–branched in the late nineties.  Hence, the opportunities for spatial price 




visible role in the setting of loan rates.  While technological developments in 
communication and travel may ultimately diminish the relevance of distance, we find only 
minor traces of such developments in our sample (which covers the 1975-1997 period).  
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TABLE 1.  THEORETICAL MODELS LINKING LOAN RATES AND DISTANCE 
    Impact on the Loan Rate of the   
Arguments & Discussed Models  Distance to the Lender
*  Distance to the Closest Competitor
*  Number of Competitors 
      
Transportation Costs (for Borrower)     
Uniform Pricing no  no  negative 
Discriminatory Pricing negative  positive  negative 
      
Monitoring Costs (for Lender)     
Marginal Cost Pricing positive  negative  negative 
Discriminatory Pricing negative  positive  negative 
      
      
  Distance to the Relationship Bank
*  Distance to the Transactional Bank
*  Number of Competitors 
      
Asymmetric Information     
Dell'Ariccia (2001) negative  no  negative 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003) negative  positive  positive / negative 
      
Notes: 
* For a given number of competitors.  
TABLE 2.  BANK AND POSTAL ZONE STATISTICS 
       
Total Number of Banks 145      
Total Number of Bank Branches 7,477      
  Postal 
Zones 
Postal 
Areas     
     
Total Number with Bank Branches 








   
Average Surface Area, in sq km 26  3,359       
Average Population 8,632  1,120,209       
  Mean Median  Min  Max Std.  Dev. 
     
Number of Banks per Postal Zone 6.4 4  0 103  10.4 
Number of Adjacent Postal Zones / Postal Zone with Bank Branches 5.1 5  0 16  2.0 
Number of Banks in Postal Zones Adjacent to Postal Zones with Bank Branches 53.6 44  2  471  42.4 
Sources: Belgian Bankers’ Association, Bankvestigingen in Belgie, 1995, CIA Factbook 1995, and Geocart, Administratieve Kaart van Belgie en Groot-
Hertogdom Luxembourg, 1992.  
TABLE 3.  DATA DESCRIPTION 
Variables Definition  Mean  Median  Min  Max  St.dev 
            
Distance             
Distance to Lender  Shortest traveling time, in minutes  6.90  4.29  0.00  51.00 7.30 
Distance to Closest Competitors  Shortest traveling time to the closest quartile competitor in the 
borrower’s postal zone, in minutes 
3.82 3.27  0.00  24.00 2.33 
Relationship Characteristics            
Main Bank  = 1 if bank considers itself as main bank,
a in percent
  58.82 100  0 100  49.22 
Duration of Relationship  Length of relationship with current lender, in years  7.93  7.47  0.00  26.39 5.44 
Competition            
Number of Competitors  Number of branches (minus the lender’s) in the borrower’s postal zone  17.18  13  1  103  15.49 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index  Summed squares of bank market shares, by number of branches, in each 
postal zone 
0.17 0.15  0.05  1.00  0.11 
Loan Rate and Size            
Loan Rate  Interest rate on loan until next revision, in basis points  812  782  200  2,200 236 
Loan Size  Size of loan, in millions of BEF
c  0.88 0.30  0.005 80 1.83 
Loan Contract Characteristics  Including 4 Loan Revisability Dummies          
Collateral  = 1 if loan is secured via collateral, in percent  26.40  0  0  100  44.08 
Repayment Duration of Loan  Repayment duration of loan, in years  2.35  0.55  0.00  20.00 3.26 
Loan Purpose            
Mortgage   = 1 if loan is a business mortgage loan  n/a
b        
Term  = 1 if loan is a business term loan (investment credit)  n/a
b        
Securitizable Term  = 1 if loan is a securitizable business term loan (investment credit)  n/a





Bridge  = 1 if loan is a bridge loan  n/a
b        
Prepay Taxes  = 1 if loan is credit to prepay taxes  n/a
b        
Consumer Credit   = 1 if loan is a consumer credit loan (capturing installment loans)  n/a
b        
Other   = 1 if loan is given for another purpose or its purpose is not specified  n/a
b       
Rollover  = 1 if loan is given to prepay another loan, in percent  10.20  0  0  100  30.27 
Firm Characteristics  Including 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies          
Small Firm  = 1 if < 10 employees and turnover < 250 mln. BEF,
c in percent  15.99  0  0  100  36.64 
Medium Firm  = 1 if > 10 employees or turnover > 250 mln. BEF,
c in percent  0.89  0  0  100  9.40 
Large Firm  = 1 if turnover > 1 bln. BEF,
c in percent  0.14  0  0  100  3.73 
Limited Partnership  = 1 if firm is limited partnership, in percent  11.97  0  0  100  32.46 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  = 1 if firm is limited partnership with equal sharing, in percent  1.18  0  0  100  10.78 
Corporation  = 1 if firm is corporation, in percent  3.78  0  0  100  19.07 
Temporary Arrangement  = 1 if firm is a temporary arrangement, in percent  0.85  0  0  100  9.18 
Firm Location           
Average Real Estate Price  In the Postal Zone in 1995, in millions of BEF
c 2.40  2.19  0.35  7.84  0.99 
Urban  = 1 if located in agglomeration with > 250,000 inhabitants, in percent  9.73  0  0  100  29.64 
Interest Rate Variables   Including 2 Year Dummies          
Government Security  Interest rate on a Belgian government security with equal repayment 
duration as loan to firm, in basis points 
389 350  305  805  87 
Term Spread  Yield on Belgian government bond of 5-years - yield on treasury bill 
with maturity of 3 months, in basis points 
179 177  100  268  31 
            
Notes.  The number of observations is 15,044.  
a The definition used by the bank to determine whether it is the main bank is: for Single-Person Businesses and 
Small Firms, have a ‘turnover’ on the current account of at least BEF 100,000 per month and buy at least two products from that bank.  
b For bank-strategic considerations 
we cannot reveal the relative importance of the types of loans.  
c 40 Belgian Francs (BEF) are approximately equal to 1 US$. 
TABLE 4.  NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY LEGAL FORM AND SIZE OF THE FIRMS 
Legal Form / Firm Size  Single-Person 
Business  Small Medium Large  All Firms 
Sole Proprietorship  12,360  -  9  -  12,369 
Limited Partnership  96  1,671  33  1  1,801 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  1  172  4  -  177 
Corporation 2  460  87  20  569 
Temporary Arrangement  25  102  1  -  128 
All Firms  12,484  2,405  134  21  15,044 
 
TABLE 5.  CORRELATION TABLE 
    (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
          
Loan  Rate  (1)  -0.051*** 0.016**  -0.063** 0.081***  0.000  -0.009 
Distance to Lender  (2)  1  0.184***  -0.033***  -0.122***  -0.071***  0.217*** 
Distance to Closest Competitors  (3)    1  0.013  0.013  0.146***  -0.001 
Main Bank  (4)      1  0.218***  0.010  -0.002 
Duration of Relationship  (5)        1  -0.005  -0.045*** 
Number  of  Competitors  (6)       1  -0.375*** 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index  (7)            1 
          
Source: The number of observations is 15,044.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, using Pearson-correlation.  
TABLE 6.  BORROWING COSTS, FIRM, AND LOAN CHARACTERISTICS 
Variable Categories  Independent Variables Model 
   
Relationship Variables Main  Bank -40.7*** 
(3.7) 
  ln(1+Duration of Relationship) 19.2*** 
(2.3) 
Loan Contract Characteristics Collateral -50.9*** 
(8.3) 
  ln(1+Repayment Duration of Loan) -92.5*** 
(9.3) 
  Included Dummies 4 Loan Revisability*** 
 
Loan Purpose Rollover 21.3*** 
(7.3) 
  Included Dummies 6 Loan Purpose*** 
 
Firm Characteristics Small  Firm 44.0** 
(19.2) 
 Medium  Firm -99.5*** 
(26.2) 
 Large  Firm -170.2*** 
(51.4) 
 Limited  Partnership -30.2 
(18.7) 
  Limited Partnership w/ ES -46.3* 
(24.7) 
 Corporation -116.2*** 
(21.1) 
 Temporary  Arrangements -35.1 
(24.2) 
  Included Dummies 8 Postal Area*** 
49 Industry*** 
Interest Rate Variables Government  Security 0.5*** 
(0.1) 
 Term  Spread 0.4*** 
(0.1) 
  Included Dummies 2 Year*** 
  Intercept 589.6*** 
(122.9) 
   
  Adjusted R
2 0.222 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The 
definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  The number of observations is 15,044.  We employ 
ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.   
TABLE 7.  BORROWING COSTS AND THE ROLE OF DISTANCE 
    Models      
Independent Variables  I  II III IV V VI  VII 
       
Distance         




























Relationship Variables         

















































Competition         
ln(1+Number of Competitors)  -0.4 
(2.6) 
      










Postal Zone Random Effects     Yes
b      
Firm Location         
Average Real Estate Price
a      -1.1 
(2.2) 
   
Urban         1 4 . 6  
(24.8) 
Urban x ln(1+Distance to Lender)         - 1 0 . 5  
(7.3) 
Urban x ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors)         2 3 . 8  
(15.0) 
Loan Contract Characteristics (incl. 4 Loan Revisability Dummies), 
Loan Purpose, 
Firm Characteristics (incl. 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies), 
Interest Rate Variables (incl. 2 Year Dummies), and Intercept 
Yes Yes Yes
c Yes Yes Yes Yes
 
Equality Restriction(s), F-statistic       8.645  3.597  3.231 
Adjusted R
2  0.227 0.223 0.143
d  0.223 0.222 0.222 0.224 
Independent Variables
  I  II III IV V VI  VII 
Table 6 Continued     Models       
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  The number of 
observations is 15,044.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
a In millions of BEF.  
b Lagrange 
multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 390.1***, and Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.0. 
 c Excluding postal area and industry dummies.  
d 
Corresponding fixed effects model statistic.  
TABLE 8.  BORROWING COSTS AND THE ROLE OF DISTANCE, BY INDUSTRY SECTOR 
Agriculture, Fishing, and 
Mining  Manufacturing Services 
 
Independent Variables / Models  II  III  V  II  III  V  II  III  V 
         
ln(1+Distance  to  Lender) -2.7  -4.4 -11.1 -5.0 -18.0  -10.0  -5.6**  -11.2*** -8.3*** 
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) 28.8  32.2  11.1  23.9  14.0  10.0  16.3***  17.7***  8.3*** 
         
Main  Bank -42.0 -48.3 -41.9  3.5  -4.6  3.2  -44.2***  -55.6*** -44.1***
ln(1+Duration of Relationship) 27.2  23.1  23.6  13.4  40.5***  13.9  19.0***  24.2***  18.7*** 
           
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index -94.4    -89.9  -32.2    -30.0  43.8***    46.1*** 
Postal Zone Random Effects   No
b    Yes
c     Yes
d  
           
Loan Contract Characteristics (incl. Loan Revisability 
Dummies), Loan Purpose, Firm Characteristics (incl. 
Postal Area and Industry Dummies), Interest Rate 









         
Equality Restriction, F- statistic     0.7524      1.389      7.296 
Adjusted R
2  0.334 0.143
f 0.335 0.287 0.276
f 0.287 0.217 0.165
f 0.217 
Number of Observations 247  247  247  900  900  900  13,897  13,897  13,897 
         
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  Agriculture, Fishing, and 
Mining comprises NACE codes 1 – 14, Manufacturing 15 – 47, and Services 48 – 99.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 
5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
a Includes all variables with variation within the groups.  
b Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 0.01.  
c Lagrange multiplier 
test of Effects versus No Effects = 209.67***.  Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 4.75.  
d Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 
320.34***.  Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 33.38.  
e Excluding postal area and industry dummies.  
f Corresponding Fixed Effects model statistic.   
TABLE 9.  DATA DESCRIPTION, BY SUBSAMPLE 
Samples  Full     Augmented 
 
 














        
Distance to Lender  6.90  2.70  9.94
c 7.32 2.57  10.19
e 
Distance to Closest Competitors  3.82  4.24  2.22
c 3.69 4.10 3.44
e 
        
Main Bank  58.82  60.68  57.46
c 63.98
d 68.15 61.46 




        
Number of Competitors  17.18  19.11  15.76
c 18.13 19.82 17.10
e 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index  0.17  0.15  0.18
c 0.17 0.14 0.19
e 
        
Loan Rate  812  825  802
c 798 829 779
e 




Collateral 26.40  24.49  27.78
c 19.74
d 19.47 19.90 




        
Small Firm  15.98  15.01  16.69
c 76.19
d 76.05 76.27 
Medium Firm  0.89  0.67  1.05
c 0.56
d 0.47 0.62 
Large Firm  0.14  0.09  0.17  0.69
d 0.26 0.95
e 
Limited Partnership  11.97  11.32  12.44
c 53.67
d 55.26 52.70 
Limited Partnership w/ ES  1.17  0.99  1.32  0.68
d 0.73 0.65 
Corporation 3.78  3.45  4.02  22.12
d 20.78 22.92 
Temporary Arrangements  0.09  0.09  0.09  2.88
d 2.63 3.03 
Age 16.57  15.85  17.04  19.68
d  19.88 19.57 
        
Assets
a      16.71  13.22  18.82
e 
Earnings / Assets
b      5.53  5.39  5.62 
Short-Term Debt / Assets
b      40.51  41.53  39.90 
Net Trade Credit / Assets
b        -2.22 -3.08 -1.78 
Intangible Assets / Assets
b       4.85  3.80  5.48
e 
Loan Size / Assets
b      18.20  14.61  20.37 
Earnings in 2 Yrs / Assets in 2 Yrs
b        1.43 -1.99 3.50 
Assets in 2 Yrs / Assets
b       1.88  1.83  1.91 
        
Number of Observations        
        
Earnings and Assets in 2 Years      936  353  583 
Age  2,655 1,046 1,609  851  321  530 
All Other Variables  15,044 6,341   8,703  1,008  380  628 
        
Notes.  The definition of most variables can be found in Table 3.  
a In millions of BEF.  
b In 
percent.  Significantly different at a 1% level from the mean of the: 
c Full – Lender = Closest subsample, 
d 
complement of the Augmented sample (14,036 observations; 1,804 for Age), 
e Augmented – Lender = 
Closest subsample.  
TABLE 10.  LOAN SIZE, DURATION, AND COLLATERAL 
Independent Variables  Incl. Loan 
Size 
By Loan Size (LS), 
in millions of BEF 
By Duration of Loan 
(DL), in years  Collateral 
    LS≤ 0.2 0.2<LS≤  2  2<LS DL<0.55  0.55≤ DL  No Yes 
 
















































































Loan Size  -22.6*** 
(1.1) 








Interest Rate Variables (including 2 
Year Dummies) and Intercept 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations  15,044 5,850  7,344  1,850  6,698  8,346 11,073  3,971 
Equality Restriction, F  0.115 3.268 4.616 1.717 0.491 0.411 0.091  1.733 
Adjusted R
2  0.084 0.011 0.136 0.665 0.089 0.085 0.175  0.447 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  We employ ordinary 
least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
TABLE 11.  LOAN TYPE / PURPOSE, FIRM TYPE, AND RELATIVE DISTANCE 
Independent Variables  Loan Type  Loan Purpose  Firm Type  Relative Distance 
 
Lines of 




Expenditures  SPB & SP 
a  Other  Lender = 
Closest  
Lender ≠ 
Closest   
































































































Interest Rate Variables (including 2 
Year Dummies) and Intercept 
Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Observations  3,678 11,366 3,490  11,554  12,360 2,684 6,341  8,703 
Equality Restriction, F  0.173 1.798 3.453  1.861 0.411  0.999 0.004 0.039 
Adjusted R
2  0.357 0.248 0.563  0.120 0.093  0.100 0.100 0.075 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  We employ ordinary 
least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
a Single-Person Businesses operating as Sole Proprietorships. 
TABLE 12.  AUGMENTED SAMPLES 
     Models    
  I II  III  IV  V 
ln(1+Distance to Lender) -16.2***  -22.5**  -22.1**  -21.8*  -22.1** 
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) 16.2***  22.5**  22.1**  21.8*  22.1** 
Main  Bank 0.1  -32.8* -34.7* -35.0* -38.2* 
ln(1+Duration  of  Relationship) 29.1*** 40.3*** 43.8*** 39.7*** 44.7*** 
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index 44.0  -0.7  4.5  22.8  30.5 
Loan  Size -8.9***  -8.9***  -8.4***  
Loan Size / Assets     -50.2***    -53.2*** 
Additional Firm Characteristics       
Age
a 0.2      
Assets
b   -0.3**  -0.4***  -0.3  -0.3** 
Earnings / Assets   -24.0  31.0  -14.7  -14.1 
Short-Term Debt / Assets   80.2**  70.9*  71.7*  67.5* 
Net Trade Credit / Assets   -66.1  -69.5  -51.9  -57.8 
Intangible  Assets  /  Assets   59.6 57.2 89.3 93.5 
Earnings in 2 Years / Assets in 2 Years       -15.2  -14.1 
Assets in 2 Years / Assets       -1.3  3.3 
     
Incl. 3 Firm Size, 8 Postal Area, 2 Industry Sector Dummies, 
Interest Rate Variables and Intercept 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Number of Observations 2,655  1,008  1,008  936  936 
Equality  Restriction,  F 0.946 1.891 1.921 1.897 1.850 
Adjusted R
2  0.101 0.159 0.159 0.160 0.160 
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in basis points.  The definition of the variables can be found in Table 3.  We employ ordinary 
least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
a In years.  
b In millions of BEF. 
APPENDIX A.  EMPIRICAL WORK INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF BANK MARKET CONCENTRATION ON BANK LOAN CONDITIONS. 
Papers Data  Source 
# Observations in Regressions 
Observation Type 
Concentration in Markets 
Geographical span: Avg. Pop. / Area 
Average HHI 
Loan Rate Measure 
The Impact of Concentration on the Loan Rate 
Impact of ∆∆∆∆ HHI = 0.1, In Basis Points 








-6 to 61*** 








credit line rate – prime rate 
Mostly Positive 
7 to 14* 







loan rate – prime rate 
Positive 
59*** 
Kim, Kristiansen and 
Vale (2001) 
Central Bank of Norway 
1,241 
Norwegian firms 


































Notes.  The measure of concentration in all studies is the Herfindahl – Hirschman Index (HHI), which can be calculated by squaring the market share of each bank 
competing in the market and then summing the resulting numbers (0 < HHI < 1).  NSSBF is the National Survey of Small Business Finance.  STB is the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of the Terms of Bank lending to business.  
a Our calculations.  
b For HHI increasing from 0.1 to 0.2.  
 c Coefficients in regressions for short-term loans in their 
models 3, 5, and 6.  
d Their models 2 and 5.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
APPENDIX B.  THE ACTUAL CLOSEST COMPETITOR AND PHYSICAL DISTANCE 
     Models    
Independent Variables  II-actual  III-actual  V-actual  II-physical  III-physical  V-physical 
      
ln(1+Distance  to  Lender) -5.3**  -10.5***  -8.6*** -3.5* -7.9***  -4.7** 
ln(1+Distance to Closest Competitors) 16.7***  18.0***  8.6***  10.4***  14.7***  4.7** 
      
Main  Bank -41.2*** -53.2*** -41.0*** -41.0*** -53.0*** -40.9*** 
ln(1+Duration  of  Relationship) 18.9*** 24.1*** 18.6*** 18.9*** 24.0*** 18.8*** 
        
Herfindahl – Hirschman Index 24.1    32.2**  31.3**    33.5** 
Postal Zone Random Effects   Yes
a     Yes
b  
        
Loan Contract Characteristics (including 4 Loan Revisability Dummies), 
Loan Purpose, 
Firm Characteristics (including 8 Postal Area and 49 Industry Dummies), 
Interest Rate Variables (including 2 Year Dummies), 
and Intercept 
Yes Yes
c  Yes Yes Yes
c  Yes
 
      
Equality Restriction, F- statistic     9.338      3.385 
Adjusted R
2  0.223 0.143 0.222 0.222 0.142 0.222 
      
Notes.  The dependent variable is the Loan Rate until next revision, in %.  In Models labeled "actual", the Distance to the actual (not 25%) Closest Competitor is 
used.  In Models "physical", the fastest physical distance (not traveling time) is used.  The definition of the other variables can be found in Table 3.  The number of 
observations is 15044.  We employ ordinary least squares estimation.  *, **, and *** = significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level, two-tailed.  
a Lagrange multiplier test of Effects 
versus No Effects = 392.23***.  Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.17.  
b Lagrange multiplier test of Effects versus No Effects = 394.25***.  
Hausman (1978) test of Fixed versus Random Effects = 35.19.  
c Excluding postal area and industry dummies.  
NOTES 
 
1 Average one-time customer switching costs in Kim, Kliger and Vale (2003) 
equal 4.12% of Norwegian corporate loan amounts.  Annualized at 9.16% (the average 9 
to 12 month T-bill rate in their sample) over an 18-year period (the median duration of 
bank-firm relationships in Norway reported by Ongena and Smith (2001)), switching 
costs can amount to bank rents of 4.20% of the banks’ marginal cost of funding (taken to 
be the T-bill rate).  The average switching cost of retail depositors at three Finnish banks 
in Shy (2002) equals 9.70%.  Assuming, as he does, a lifetime deposit relationship, 
switching costs can result in bank rents totaling 9.70% of their marginal cost of funding 
(by construction this ratio is independent of the level of the T-bill rate for a lifetime 
relationship). 
2 GDP / Capita: Belgium (B) = $ 18,040, U.S. (US) = $ 25,850; Financial Assets 
/ GDP: B = 4.5, US = 3.1; Banking Assets / GDP: B = 2.5, US = 0.5; Number of 
Telephones / Capita: B = 0.46, US = 0.50; Kilometers of Paved Highways / Capita: B = 
1.20, US = 1.37.  Financial Asset ratios are from 1993; the rest of the data is from 1994.  
Financial Assets aggregates Banking Assets, Open-End Investment Company Assets, 
Equity Market Capitalization, International and Domestic Debt Securities.  Sources: 
Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997) and CIA Factbook 1995. 
3 Distance also determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms 
within bank holding companies (Berger and DeYoung (2001), Berger and DeYoung 
(2002)), the strength of informational contagion between banks (Aharony and Swary 
(1996)), and the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of U.S. private firms 
(Lerner (1995)).  Physical distance further influences activities on financial and product 
markets in general.  International capital flows seem bound by geographical proximity 
(Portes and Rey (2001)), but so is the composition and returns on actively managed U.S. 
mutual funds (Coval and Moskowitz (2001)), the trading profitability of traders on the 
German electronic exchange Xetra (Hau (2001)) and the portfolio choices of American 
(Huberman (2001)) and Finnish investors (Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001)).  Local 
financial development is further found to encourage business start-ups, to enhance entry 
and competition in product markets, and to foster firm growth (Guiso, Sapienza and 
Zingales (2002)). 
4 See, for example, Kilkenny and Thisse (1999) and Chapter 7 in Tirole (1988) 
for a review. 
5 Almazan (2002) also assumes bank monitoring costs increase with distance to 
model the trade-off between bank expertise and capital. 
6 The correspondence between borrower-lender distance and loan rate may also 
become non-monotonic if monitoring costs are further dependent on loan size (Wong 
and Chan (1993)). 
7 An increase in the number of banks also decreases the loan rate in more general 
models of imperfect Cournot competition between a finite number of banks.  See, for 
example, the rendition of the Monti (1972)-Klein (1971) model in Freixas and Rochet 
(1997) (pp. 57-60). 
8 In Boot and Thakor (2000), more interbank competition encourages banks not 






9 See Binks and Ennew (1997) for evidence on bank choice by U.K. small firms. 
10 For example, Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1989), Anderson and de Palma 
(2000), and Pinkse, Slade and Brett (2002). 
11 Independents or single-person businesses are natural persons who run a small 
business in which they are employed themselves. 
12 The bank argues that loans starting earlier than 1995 were prepaid.  We have a 
dummy variable Rollover in all empirical specifications, capturing whether the new loan 
served to repay an old loan. 
13 549 bank branches lend to firms located in 921 out of 1,168 postal zones.  The 
concentration index of the number of loans (sum of shares squared) is 22 (equal shares 
would yield an index equal to 9).   
14 According to a two-digit NACE classification.  NACE is the European 
industrial classification system subdividing industries.  The industry concentration index 
across the 53 industries is 1,238 (equal shares would result in an index equal to 204). 
15 The dataset covers loans granted to 13,104 borrowers - implying that the 
average borrower maintained only 1.36 loans at that bank. 
16 The Annual Report of the Belgian Bankers Association reports 7,668 branches.  
We consolidate multiple branches of the same bank at the same address. 
17 Belgium covers 30,230 sq km in land surface (source: CIA Factbook 1995). 
18 Such as the shortest, but not necessarily fastest, driving distance or the shortest 
distance as-the-crow-flies. 
19 For example, a small-town bank branch is listed as underwriting a dozen 
contracts located around the country.  We suspect an address-recording error in the 
dataset we received.  Unfortunately, we cannot ask the bank to check such entries. 
20 For example, serious misspelling of street names invariably leads the mapping 
software to “overshoot” the correct distance.  We track and fix most (but possibly not 
all) such mapping problems. 
21 For example, some borrowers reside in a ritzy beach resort (often more than an 
hour drive from their respective lenders in various locations inland) most likely to lower 
their community taxes. 
22 We are left with 11,222 different borrowers in the sample.  We report only the 
statistics for the set of all contracts, as the borrower-based statistics are very similar. 
23 The loan rate and type of the 2,732 discarded contracts on average does not 
significantly differ (at a 1% level) from the 15,044 remaining contracts, though the 
borrowers are somewhat more “transactional” (mean Main Bank = 52.5%, mean 
Duration of Relationship = 7.2 years) and larger than the firms remaining in the sample 
(the means of the Small, Medium, and Large Firm dummies are 20.6%, 3.4% and 0.4%, 
respectively; the mean Loan Size is BEF 1.09 million). 
24 The sample is highly representative in this regard.  The average speed of travel 
in Belgium across all modes of transportation was 31.1 km/h in 1998 according to a 
National Survey of Mobility (source: Belgian National Institute of Statistics at 
www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d37_nl.htm#1).  Traveling time and driving distance are 
highly correlated.  For example, the correlation coefficient for the 15,044 borrower-
lender pairs is 0.96. 
25 75% of the surveyed Canadian entrepreneurs in Mallett and Sen (2001) 






loans and other financial services.  However, the average entrepreneur in their study 
obtains a loan of 172,000 USD, while the average loan size in our study is only around 
20,000 USD. 
26 For example, Cole and Wolken (1995), Table 1. 
27 Petersen and Rajan (2002) document that firm size is positively correlated with 
distance (their Table III, column VI).  However, the effect seems rather limited for 
smaller firm sizes. 
28 Belgian gasoline prices at the pump are typically more than double the prices 
in the US, mainly because of taxation.  For example, in the last week of September 2001 
regular gasoline at the pump went for 1.48 USD/gallon in the US and 3.11 USD/gallon 
in Belgium (source: Energy Info Administration and Belgian Petroleum Federation). 
29 The US land surface measures 9,158,960 sq km, making the US 303 times 
larger than Belgium (source: CIA Factbook 1995). 
30 Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2002) note that reweighing the 
NSSBF to make the survey nationally representative (because the NSSBF under-samples 
the very smallest firms) decreases the average distance in their sample from 26.1 to 11.8 
miles (their Footnote 15). 
31 See also Cyrnak and Hannan (2001). 
32 We also analyze the postal codes for all 17,776 contracts.  The percentage of 
firms located in another postal zone (area) than the lender increased from 35% (2%) 
prior to 1981 to 47% (7%), after 1993.  If we assume a conservatively long average 
traveling distance of 3 (30) km within a postal zone (area) and 87.5 km across postal 
areas (i.e., half the integer of the square root of the surface of each respective region), 
average distances increased by around 45%.  Hence, our mapping technology and 
screening procedures seem not to have biased our results across time. 
33 Only 179 borrowers report different addresses on loan contracts written in the 
same year, and an additional 75 borrowers report different addresses across different 
years.  351 contracts with the same address list a different borrower name.  Hence, only a 
few borrowers either move within the sample period or manage multiple businesses. 
34 Source: Annual Reports of the Belgian Bankers’ Association.  For years prior 
to 1991, we imputed the number of bank branches using growth rates in the numbers of 
commercial bank branches only.  Ideally, we would like to break out the numbers for the 
individual bank we study. 
35 We regress the Distance to Lender on an intercept, the Starting Year of the 
Relationship, a Large Firm dummy, and an interaction term between the latter two 
variables.  We want to investigate whether technology affects larger firms in a different 
way than other firms.  Distance grows significantly, but only by around 9 seconds per 
year, while the growth in distance between large firms and their lenders is 
indistinguishable from the growth in distance between small firms and their lenders.  
When we add the (national) number of bank branches to this specification, the growth in 
distance drops to a significant but small 4 seconds per year.  The closure of one branch 
in each postal zone (implying a decrease in the number of bank branches about equal the 
observed drop between 1990 and 1997) increases the traveling time by around 1 minute 






36 See Petersen and Rajan (2002).  In addition, firms may be poached, and hence 
may switch banks, more frequently if they are located farther away from a bank branch 
(Fudenberg and Tirole (2000)). 
37 In less densely branched areas proximity may play a more prominent role.  For 
example, regressing Distance to Lender on Distance to Closest Competitors yields a 
slope coefficient of 0.57*** and an intercept equaling 4.69***.  These estimates suggest 
a crossover point of around 11 minutes at which the Distance to the Lender on average 
becomes smaller than the Distance to the quartile Closest Competitor.  Less than 1% of 
all borrowers in our sample are located in such areas. 
38 We use Belgian Francs (BEF) throughout the paper, but initially indicate 
equivalent amounts in U.S. Dollars (USD).  Belgium switched to the Euro on January 
1
st, 1999. 
39 A possible effect of Main Bank is that the bargaining power of a firm 
increases, as it also buys other products at that bank.  In other words, cross-subsidization 
could negatively influence the loan rate. 
40 Large Belgian firms maintain more than ten bank relationships (Ongena and 
Smith (2000)).  On the other hand, the average small Belgian firm surveyed by de Bodt, 
Lobez and Statnik (2001) employs only two banks.  The firms in the latter sample are on 
average more than three times larger and 7 years older than the firms in our sample. 
41 As in all Tables, *, **, and *** indicate significance at a 10%, 5% and 1% 
level (two-tailed). 
42 The variables are further discussed at length in Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000). 
43 We let variable rate loans commence at the loan origination date or at the 
earliest interest rate revision date occurring within the sample period. 
44 Three industries are no longer represented in the reduced sample, while one 
industry dummy is suppressed. 
45 Table 5 contains the correlation coefficients between these variables.  Most 
correspondences we document in the multivariate analyses are already foreshadowed in 
this Table. 
46 This specification merely replicates an exercise by Degryse and Van Cayseele 
(2000), who drop large firms and analyze the remaining 17,429 observations, and 
Degryse and Van Cayseele (1998), who employ all 17,776 observations. 
47 See, for example, Barclay and Smith (1995) for an explanation of these 
observed differences in debt maturity. 
48 Additional regressions (one without size dummies and another one without 
legal form dummies) confirm the existence of a positive legal form and a negative firm 
size effect.  We also collect Total Assets for 1,063 firms.  Within each firm size 
category, corporations are on average always larger than any other legal form. 
49 We restrict the coefficient on the Government Security variable to be equal to 
one to estimate the impact of the independent variables on the spread rather than on the 
loan rate.  The main results are unaffected.  We further replace both interest rate 
variables (and the two year dummies) by weekly time effects.  While the time effects are 
significant as a group, the coefficients (in all main models we report) are otherwise 
virtually unaffected.  We focus on specifications incorporating the interest rates, as this 






50 Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000) provide a detailed discussion of 
these results and the related theoretical and empirical literature. 
51 Mallett and Sen (2001) find a similar result for the Canadian banking industry 
(their Table III, Columns 4 and 5).  More in general, Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) report 
that once a market has between three and five firms, the next entrant has little effect on 
competitive conduct. 
52 The U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (April 1997) label markets with an HHI above 0.18 ‘highly 
concentrated’ and an HHI below 0.10 ‘unconcentrated’. 
53 The average price is based on all non-farm real estate sold during 1995 in 589 
different municipalities.  Some municipalities cover multiple postal zones (source: 
Belgian National Institute of Statistics at ecodata.mineco.fgov.be “verkopen van 
onroerende goederen”). 
54 Car entry time or any other fixed departure time cannot determine bank choice.  
However, service and queuing time can differ across banks. We assume queuing time to 
be uncorrelated with our distance measures.  This assumption is reasonable, we think, as 
branches typically operate on a first-come-first-served basis. 
55 Geographical clustering of bank branches may introduce spurious correlation 
between our two distance measures and hence a bias against finding significant results. 
56 The estimated coefficient on the Predicted Distance from Lender variable in 
Model II in Table VII in Petersen and Rajan (2002) implies a decrease by 62 basis points 
in the U.S., if one assumes the average speed of travel in the U.S. is the same as in 
Belgium.  Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the Number of Bank Branches per 
square kilometer in Model I Table 3 in Hyytinen and Toivanen (2002) implies an 
increase of 18 basis points in deposit rates in Finland (for example, increasing the 
average 0.008 branches / km
2 or 1 branch / 125 km
2 to 4 branches / 125 km
2 or 0.032 
branches / km
2, reduces the average distance say from 11 km to 5.5 km or from 21 
minutes to 10.5 minutes of traveling time, and decreases the deposit rate by 26 basis 
points). 
57 The estimated coefficient on the Competition Index variable in Column 3 in 
Table II in Mallett and Sen (2001) implies an increase of 15 to 25 basis points per extra 
minute of traveling to the closest competitor in Canada (i.e., for the number of other 
banks going from 1 to 2 or 3 within a convenient distance between 2.5 and 4.5 
kilometers). 
58 All calculations are averaged over the zero to one standard deviation interval. 
59 The gross monthly wage of Belgian entrepreneurs and managers was 153,416 
BEF, and full-time employees worked 1,543 hours on average per year (source: Belgian 
National Institute of Statistics at www.statbel.fgov.be/figures/d321_nl.htm). 
60 Including BEF 1.8 / minute for gas (at a speed of 31 km / h in a car using 10 
liters of gasoline / 100 km and a pump price of 35 BEF / liter) and BEF 1.20 / minute for 
maintenance and tires (source: Belgian Petroleum Federation and AAA “Your Driving 
Costs”). 
61 We could be picking up the impact of “social distance” (e.g., the loan officer 
and entrepreneur are members of the same weekend soccer club).  However, we think it 
would be highly coincidental that social distance would result in imputed traveling costs, 






empirical work embeds substantial spatial simplifications, focuses on relatively small 
distances, and glosses over the possibilities for travel scheduling by either borrowers or 
loan officers (e.g., borrowers dropping off kids, loan officers visiting multiple 
borrowers).  However, we contend these issues make it less likely that location matters 
significantly and is reflected in reasonable proportions in the loan rates we observe. 
62 We apply the estimates from Table 7 Model V to each individual observation.  
Median = 14 basis points, minimum = 0, maximum = 29. 
63 We employ the coefficient estimate (18.6) from Table 7 Model V.  We 
annualize at the government security rate. 
64 We collect Age for 2,655 borrowing firms.  The mean age for the 1,712 main 
bank borrowers is 14.7 years, while for the 943 non-main bank borrowers it is 20.0 
years. 
65 Antwerpen, Brussel – Schaarbeek, Charleroi, Gent, and Liege (source: UN 
Demographic Yearbook 1995).  We assign postal zones on the basis of the current 
circumscription. 
66 As the distance measures are in log form, the interaction coefficients suggest a 
squaring of traveling times.  Admittedly the effect is estimated rather imprecisely.  While 
the equality restrictions can be rejected at a 5% level of significance, removing all four 
restrictions does not alter results qualitatively. 
67 The means are less (significantly) different if we cut by “absolute distance”, 
i.e. compare the 33
rd percentile (Lender to Distance ≤ 3 minutes) with the 66
th percentile 
(≥ 7 minutes) of the full sample. 
68 We also randomly select one loan per firm (from the original 15,044 
observations) to abate the impact of those firms subscribing to multiple contracts.  Those 
firms may be larger and have other (for us unobservable) characteristics.  Nonetheless, 
the results for the remaining 11,222 loans are very similar to the results reported so far 
and we choose not to report them. 
69 We drop 50 firms with negative equity and/or debt-asset ratios larger than one.  
Retaining those observations does not alter the results. 
70 We replaced our prior choices Earnings, Short-Term Debt, and Intangibles 
with Profits / Earnings After Taxes, Debt, and Start-up Costs respectively, but the results 
don’t change. 
71 In our full sample the average Single-Person Business borrows BEF 0.8 mln. 
(USD 20,000), the average Small Firm obtains BEF 1 mln. (USD 25,000), and the 
average Medium or Large Firm gets BEF 2.5 mln. (USD 62,500). 
72 Source: History of Belgacom at www.belgacom.be. 
73 “The Death of Distance” is the title of a book by Frances Cairncross.  Its 
second edition is published by Harvard Business School Press.  See also 
www.deathofdistance.com. 